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The New York State court system is a big and complex organization
with a large staff, substantial funding and massive caseloads. Despite its
very considerable resources, it is believed by many to be inadequately
funded given the quality of services it should be providing; and it quite
obviously is structurally archaic. To improve the court system's effec-
tiveness as the centerpiece justice agency in the state, many structural
and administrative reforms in the system through the years have been
proposed. Many of these reforms have been adopted but as demands on
the system change, new reform proposals are made and some of the old
ones revived with added support. Pressure for change is a continuing
feature of court operations in New York as it is in most states and at the
federal level as well.
This article focuses on how the New York State court system is
structured and administered and on some of the possibilities for structur-
ally and administratively reforming the system. Without sufficient
knowledge of how the system is organized and operated, reforms cannot
be adequately understood or evaluated. Sequentially, coverage of the ar-
ticle is as follows: Part I, current structure and administration of the state
court system in New York, noting some of the recent reforms that have
been adopted; Part II, external controls and pressures that influence court
reform possibilities; Part III, important recent reform proposals for New
York State courts, not as yet adopted; Part IV, some other reform possi-
bilities that have promise but little or no present support in New York;
and Part V, concluding observations, stressing more serious problems
facing the New York court system and prospects for their resolution.
* Professor ofLaw, New York Law School; Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor ofLaw
Emeritus, Yale Law School.
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1. CURRENT STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION
A Court Structure
[Vol. 43
The New York State court structure in very general terms resembles
that ofmost other large-population states and the federal system: a series
of trial courts, one or more intermediate appellate courts, and a top ap-
pellate court, in New York, the Court of Appeals. In detail, however, the
New York court structure is complex, somewhat unique, and in the
opinion of many, antiquated. The complexity of the court structure is
most obvious at the trial court level. There are eleven different types of
trial courts in the New York State court system, some of general juris-
diction, some with jurisdiction of only a specialized field of law, and
some with broad but inferior jurisdiction. Some trial courts may also hear
appeals from lower courts; and to some extent, the jurisdictions of differ-
ent types of trial courts overlap. In jurisdictional importance there are
two types of trial courts in the New York system: courts of superior ju-
risdiction and those of inferior jurisdiction. The courts of superior juris-
diction, those that may hear what are considered more serious matters,
are the supreme court, county court, family court, surrogate's court and
court of claims. Courts of inferior jurisdiction, those that may generally
hear only what are considered less serious matters, are the New York
City Civil Court, New York City Criminal Court, other city courts, dis-
trict courts (there are district courts only in Nassau County and part of
Suffolk County), town courts and village courts. The supreme court, as a
trial court, has unlimited original jurisdictionl but hears mostly more se-
rious civil and criminal matters? It is a statewide court with a branch in
each county. There also is a surrogate's court and a family court in each
county within the state, the surrogate's court considering mostly estate
matters3 and family court mostly matters pertaining to children.4
1. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
2. E.g., large civil claims, mortgage foreclosures, divorce, and felonies.
3. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 12(d)-(e).
4. E.g., adoption, foster care, support, custody, and delinquency-but not divorce,
separation or annulment, matters within the jurisdiction of the supreme court. On the
jurisdiction offamily courts, see N.Y. CoNST. art. VI, § 13(b)-(c).
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-Appeals from judgments of courts of record of origirt:!1 instance that finaUy determine .actions where the only question im'Ol,.-ed is the validity
of a StolM:ory prv.ision under the New York State or United States Constitution may be taken direa:ly to the Court ofAppeals.
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Each county outside New York City has a county court with jurisdiction
over both felonies and misdemeanorss and over civil claims generally up
to $25,000.6 The court of claims hears principally tort and other claims
against the State ofNew Yore and sits in Albany. All the courts of infe-
rior jurisdiction generally may hear only minor criminal matters or civil
cases involving lesser amounts of money, the jurisdictional limits of
town and village courts, successors to earlier justice of the peace courts,
generally being considerably lower than those of other inferior jurisdic-
tion courts.s However inapt the term, since amendment of the Judiciary
Article of the New York Constitution in 1961, the New York State court
system has commonly been referred to by court administrators and others
as the ''unified court system.,,9
A significant structural feature of some trial courts, and one that has
become more common in New York as well as other states, is creation of
specialized courts which are parts or divisions of existing courts, a de-
velopment that greatly complicates the New York court structure.1O The
5. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 10.20 (McKinney 1992).
6. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § l1(a); N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 190, 190-a, 190b, 191
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1998).
7. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 9; N.Y. JUD. LAW, CT. OF CLAIMS ACT art. 2
(McKinney 1989).
8. For information on the jurisdiction of lower courts, see the following: New
York City Civil Court, N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 15(b); N.Y. CITY CN. CT. ACT, N.Y. JUD.
LAW art. 2 (McKinney 1989); New York City Criminal Court, N.Y. CONST. art. 6, §
15(c); N.Y. CITY CRIM. CT. ACT, N.Y. JUD. LAW art. 3 (McKinney 1989); city courts
outside New York City; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 17(a), (b), UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT, N.Y.
JUD. LAW arts. 2, 20 (McKinney 1989); district courts, N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § l6(d);
UNIFORM DIST. CT., N.Y. JUD. LAW arts. 2 , 20 & § 2402 (McKinney 1989); and town
and village courts, N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 17(a), (b); UNIFORM JUST. CT. ACT, N.Y. JUD.
LAW arts. 2, 20 (McKinney 1989); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 10.30 (McKinney 1992),
jurisdiction oflocal criminal courts.
9. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 1 uses the term ''unified court system" as including all
state and local courts in the state.
Given the views ofmany as to what a unified court system should be, it is inaccurate
to refer to the New York system as unified. As one commentator has observed, following
the 1961 constitutional amendment, the New York courts "were far from 'unified'; but, at
least, they could now fairly be described as part of a system." MARC BLOUSTEIN, A
SHORT HISTORY OF THENEW YORK COURT SYSTEM 10 (l987).
10. Among the New York specialized courts, subunits of other courts, are these:
the Commercial Division ofthe Supreme Court; New York City Housing Court, a part of
the New York City Civil Court; domestic violence courts, parts of the New York City
Criminal Court; and community courts, parts of the New York City Criminal Court. In
addition, the family court in New York City has four function-based divisions: protec-
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specialized courts seek to provide faster and more expert determinations
by concentrating the efforts of judges and support staff on a relatively
narrow range of cases. To achieve still further efficiency and effective-
ness, some of these courts even have specialized parts.l1 A few of the
specialty courts, among them drug treatment courts, have relatively low
case volumes.12 Others, such as the housing court in New York City,
have very high case volumes.13 Some of the specialty courts commenced
tive/permanency planning, juvenile delinquency/persons in need of supervision (pINS),
domestic violence/custody, and support! paternity. If a family has a case that may fall in
more than one division, the case will be assigned to a division hearing the most critical
matter. Several family courts outside New York City have recently established similar
subunits. On family court divisions, see JUDITH S. KAYE & JONATHAN LIPPMAN, FAMILY
JUSTICE PROGRAM PHASE 2, at 13-30 & 35-37 (1997); JUDITH S. KAYE, THE STATE OF THE
JUDICIARY 9-10 (1999). On domestic violence courts, see id. at 18-21.
Small claims courts also are subunits of other courts. In New York City, small
claims courts are parts ofthe New York City Civil Court, in Nassau and Suffolk Counties
they are parts of the district court, they are parts of city courts in some places, and parts
of town and village courts in others. On small claims courts, see Gerald Lebovits, Small
Claims Courts Offer Prompt Adjudication Based on Substantive Law, N.Y. ST. B.J., Dec.
1998, at 6.
Drug treatment courts, too, are subunits of several different courts, among them the
Brooklyn Supreme Court, the family court in New York and Suffolk Counties, and some
city courts. On drug treatment courts, see JUDITH S. KAYE & JONATHAN LIPPMAN,
CR1MINAL JUSTICE PROGRAM 24-27 (1996). As ofearly 1999 there were 15 drug treatment
courts in New York, with six more to open later in the yeat: See id. at 17. The goal is to
have 30 such courts in operation by the end ofnext fiscal year. See id. at 3 (2000).
For brief descriptions of most New York specialty courts, see also STATE OF NEW
YORK, UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, BUDGET for April 1, 2000 to March 31, 2001 [hereinafter
PROPOSED BUDGET 2000-2001], Executive Summary. This budget proposal was approved
by the Court ofAppeals, certified by the Chief Judge, and submitted to the state legisla-
ture and the Governor. It includes considerable background information on state courts
and other agencies and organizations within the judicial system.
11. The New York City Housing Court has resolution parts, trial ready parts, a rent
deposit part, enforcement part, and a cooperative-condominium part. See JUDITH S. KAYE
& JONATHAN LIPPMAN, HOUSING COURT PROGRAM BREAKING NEW GROUND 8-13 (1997).
Most housing court cases are proceedings by landlords against tenants, seeking evictions
or damages for tenant rental or other lease term violations.
12. In 1998, drug treatment courts statewide had about 1,500 persons as active
participants in their programs. See STATE OF NEW YORK, UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM,
PROPOSED BUDGET for April 1, 1999 to March 31, 2000 [hereinafter PROPOSED BUDGET
1999-2000] at xv.
13. In 1998, there were 326,212 cases filed in the New York City Housing Court, a
division ofthe New York City Civil Court. See PROPOSED BUDGET 2000-2001, supra note
10, at 168.
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operations only very recently. For example, the first domestic violence
court opened in 1996; the first commercial division of the supreme court
opened in 1995;14 and the first community court, the Midtown Commu-
nity Court, opened in 1993.15
The New York appellate court structure consists of the Court of Ap-
peals as the highest appellate coud6 and appellate divisions of the su-
preme court as the highest intermediate appellate courtsP There are four
appellate division courts, one for each of four geographical areas into
which the state is divided, referred to as departments. By far the largest
department in population is the Second Department, which covers New
York City-other than New York (Manhattan) and Bronx Counties-and
much of the surrounding metropolitan area.ls Some other courts also
have appellate jurisdiction: appellate terms of the supreme coud9 and
county courts?O Appellate terms of the supreme court may be created by
any appellate division departmenf l but only the First and Second De-
partments have such terms.
14. It is asserted by some that courts specializing in business litigation create an
elitist two-tier system ofjustice: one tier for the business community and one for average
citizens. For this and other arguments against business litigation courts, as well as argu-
ments for them, see Ember R. Junge, Business Courts: Efficient Justice or Two-Tiered
Elitism?, 24 WM. MITCHELLL. REv. 315 (1998). For a favorable report on the New York
commercial division court, see Robert L. Haig, Can New York's New Commercial Divi-
sion Resolve Business Disputes as Well as Anyone?, 13 TOURO L. REv. 191 (1996).
Commercial division courts have recently been added in Monroe, Erie, Nassau and West-
chester Counties. See PROPOSED BUDGET 2000-2001, supra note 10, at v.
15. For a detailed study of the Midtown Community Court, see NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, DISPENSING JUSTICE LOCALLY, THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS
OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT (1997).
16. On the jurisdiction ofthe Court ofAppeals, seeN.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
17. On the jurisdiction ofappellate division courts, see N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 4(k)
and N.Y. C.P.L.R. art. 57.
18. The Second Department includes the Counties of Kings, Queens, Richmond,
Nassau, Suffolk, Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, and Westchester (part of New
York City, all ofLong Island, and five New York counties northwest ofNew York City).
See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a), 6(a).
19. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 8(d), (e); N.Y. RULES OF CT., SUP. CT., App. Term,
1st Dept., Rule 640.1 (McKinney 1999); N.Y. RULEs OF CT., SUP. CT., App. Term, 2d
Dept., Rule 730.1 (McKinney 1999).
20. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § II(c); N.Y. JUD. LAW, UNIFORM CITY CT. ACT §
1701 (McKinney 1989); N.Y. JUD. LAW, UNIFORM DISTRICT CT. ACT § 1701 (McKinney
1989); N.Y. JUD. LAW, UNIFORM JUSTICE CT. ACT § 1701 (McKinney 1989).
21. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 8(a), (b).
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Generally, only fmal judgments and orders are appealable. Most ap-
peals heard by the Court of Appeals are from appellate division judg-
ments or orders. Appeals heard by appellate division courts are typically
those from judgments or orders of appellate terms of the supreme court,
county courts or trial courts of superior jurisdiction. Supreme court ap-
pellate terms and county courts hear most all appeals from courts of infe-
rior jurisdiction. As of right appeals to the Court of Appeals are very
limited, most appeals to that court re~uire permission of the Court of
Appeals or an appellate division COurt,2 and only a small percentage of
motions for leave to appeal is granted?3
B. Funding
The State ofNew York now provides almost complete financial sup-
port for all nonfederal courts in the state, except town and village courts,
these latter largely funded by court fees, fines, and local government ap-
propriations?4 Another exception to state funding of the courts is that
22. As of right appeals to the Court ofAppeals are authorized in certain cases, in-
cluding those in which two or more appellate division justices dissent on a question of
law in favor of the appellant; in certain cases turning on a question of constitutional law;
and in certain cases in which the appellant has stipulated that upon affirmance, judgment
absolute shall be entered against him. On appeals to the Court ofAppeals as ofright, see
N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b)(1)-(3); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5601 (McKinney 1995); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 450.70(d), 450.80 (McKinney 1994). On appeals to the Court of Appeals
by permission, see N.Y. CONST., art. VI, § 3(b)(4)-(7), N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5602, N.Y. CUM.
PROC. LAW § 460.20 (McKinney 1994). The Court ofAppeals also may decide a question
of New York law certified to by the U.S. Supreme Court, a U.S. court of appeals or a
court of last resort of any state ifthe question ofNew York law is determinative ofa case
before the certifying court and there is no controlling New York Court ofAppeals prece-
dent on the question. See N.Y. CONST., art. VI, § 3(9); N.Y. RULES OF CT., Court ofAp-
peals, Rule 500.17 (McKinney 1999). For statistical analyses of cases considered and
decided by the Court of Appeals in a recent year based on types of appellate right (e.g.,
court permission), see 1998 ANNuAL REpORT OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, 3-
5 apps.
Judicial permission in some cases also may be required to appeal to an intermediate
appellate court, see N.Y. C.P.L.R §§ 5701(c), 5703(a) (McKinney 1995); N.Y. CuM.
PROC. LAW § 460.15 (McKinney 1994).
23. In 1998 the New York Court of Appeals granted 91 of the 1,196 motions for
leave to appeal in civil cases and 57 of the 2,982 applications for leave to appeal in
criminal cases. See 1998 ANNuAL REpORT OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 5, 6.
24. For a generally negative view of town and village court financing, see ruRIS
M. PROVINE, JunGING CREDENTIALS, NONLAWYER JunGES AND THE POLmcs OF
PROFESSIONALISM 132-37 (1986). However, funding seems less of a problem in some of
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providing and maintaining court facilities, including courthouses, is
largely the responsibility of local government, although increasingly the
state has been assuming some of the costs of these facilities both to re-
lieve localities of the financial burden and to provide more courthouses
that are adequate in size and maintenance?5
The total New York state budget for the courts is now over 1.1 bil-
lion dollars a year?6 This is up from 811 million dollars in fiscal year
1988-8927 and 889 million dollars in fiscal year 1991-92?8 Nearly all of
the larger, more affluent town courts, e.g., in some Westchester County towns where
part-time town judges are paid in the range of $32,000-$35,000 per year for relatively
short periods of time on the bench. See THE FuND FOR MODERN COURTS, WESTCHESTER
COUNTY COURT MONITORS REpORT ON THE TOWN AND VILLAGE COURTS 7-13 (1998).
In fiscal 1999-2000, the State of New York did make $500,000 available to town
and village courts pursuant to a 1999 statute establishing a Justice Court Assistance Pro-
gram. 1999 N.Y. CoNS. LAWS SERVICE, 1999 Session Laws, ch. 280. Funds made avail-
able under this program are for such pUIposes as automation, personnel training, acquir-
ing law books and improving court facilities. Grants to anyone court are capped at
$20,000 per year. On the 1999 act, see also PROPOSED BUDGET 2000-2001, supra note
10, at xii.
25. On increased state funding of court facilities, see infra notes 136-137 and ac-
companying text.
26. The exact figure for fiscal year 1999-2000 is $1,145,040,848. See 1999 N.Y.
ACTS, ch. 51 (legislature and judiciary budget). The federal judicial budget is about three
times as much as that of the State ofNew York ($3.3 billion in 1997). See STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. TABLE 542 (1998).
For fiscal year 2000-2001, the Judiciary is requesting a budget increase of3.4%, or
$38,138,564 over what was appropriated for the judiciary in the previous fiscal year. See
PROPOSED BUDGET 2000-2001, supra note 10, at ii and 6. Among requested increases is
funding for 25 additional judicial positions. See id. at 6.
27. See 1989 ANNuAL REpORT OF THE CmEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS 3
[hereinafter ANNuAL REpORT, with appropriate year stated].
28. See 1992 ANNuAL REpORT at 4. Chief Judge Sol Wachtler's court budget re-
quest for fiscaI1991-92, that resulted in litigation against Governor Cuomo, was for $966
million dollars. The ChiefJudge's controversy with the Governor resulted when the Gov-
ernor's proposed budget for the judiciary, reflecting a stringent period in the state's fi-
nances, was for less than what the judiciary had received the previous year and much less
than what the judicial system had requested. Judge Wachtler's suit challenged the Gover-
nor's budget on inherent powers grounds. Governor Cuomo responded with a suit against
the Chief Judge to enjoin the earlier proceeding. Each action was later withdrawn when
the Governor agreed to increase the judiciary's recommended budget allocation to what it
had been the previous year, with only very minor changes. On the controversy between
the Chief Judge and the Governor, see id. at 8; Howard B. Glaser, Wachtler v. Cuomo:
The Limits ofInherent Power, 14 PACE L. REv. 111 (1994); a shorter version of this arti-
cle appears in 78 JUDICATURE 12 (1994); Peter M. Shane, Interbranch .Accountability ill
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the state's court eXfenditures come from the state's general fund, 96% in
fiscal 1999-2000,2 the remaining 4% in that year from special funds,30
including some special purpose grants from the federal governmene1
Trial courts (courts of original jurisdiction) received 84% of 1999-2000
funds budgeted for the judiciary,32 appellate courts (including the Court
State Government and the Constitutional Requirement ofJudicial Independence, 61 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1998, at 21, 45-56; Note, Wachtler v. Cuomo: Does New
York's Judiciary Have an Inherent Right of Self-Preservation?, 14 PACE L. REv. 153
(1994); and ABA, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON FuNDiNG THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 40-41 (1992)
[hereinafter SPECIAL COMMITIEE], excerpted in 32 JUDGES J., no. 1, at 7 (1993). The
judge's controversy with the governor is symptomatic of the justice system's vulnerabil-
ity, courts included, to legislative budget cuts, especially in stringent financial periods. A
decade or so ago many states reduced their justice system budgets despite rising court
caseloads. A Special ABA Committee made a detailed study of the problem, considered
it a very serious threat to the entire justice system, and recommended that bar leaders and
judges intensify their legislative lobbying efforts to obtain needed justice system funding,
building coalitions with other groups in doing so. See SPECIAL CoMMlTIEE at 28-31.
In adequacy offunding, the federal courts fare better than state courts, New York in-
cluded; but a recent long-range planning study of the federal courts complained about the
level of federal court funding:
Any comparison to the state courts discloses that the federal courts
have been well funded. During the past decade, Congress has pro-
vided the judicial branch with a rate of resources growth about equal
to that of the Department ofJustice, but well above that of executive
branch agencies and, in recent years, that of the Congress itself. Con-
gressional penury has not placed the federal courts in their current
circumstances. Rather, the current situation results from the increased
workload of the federal courts and their honest adherence to empiri-
cal workload formulae as the basis for budget justification. Where
workload has increased, the federal judiciary has argued that re-
sources ought to increase as well. Where workload remains flat or
decreases markedly, budget requests are correspondingly limited or
reduced.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS 93-94 (1995).
29. The general fund court operations' budget for 1999-2000 amounted to
$1,097,233,799. See PROPOSED BUDGET 2000-2001, supra note 10, at 7.
30. The special funds budgeted for 1999-2000 amounted to $48,069,569. See id. at
8.
31. Much of this federal grant money has been for drug treatment courts. See
PROPOSED BUDGET 2000-2001, supra note 10, at 174.
32. For 1999-2000 the budgeted allocation to courts of original jurisdiction was
$961,258,925. See 1999 N.Y. ACTS, ch. 51 (legislature and judiciary budget).
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ofAppeals) received about 5%,33 and the balance went to administration
and a miscellany of court programs, among them attorney licensing, aid
to localities, employee fringe benefits and the Lawyers' Fund for Client
Protection.34
Most of the important decisions as to state funding of the courts are
made annually in the course of preparing and adopting the state budget.
Each year the court system submits to the governor a very detailed
budget covering estimated fmancial needs of the courts for the ensuing
year. Pursuant to a constitutional requirement, prior to submission this
budget is approved by the Court of Appeals and certified to by the Chief
Judge.35 The proposed budget is prepared under the direction of the court
system's budget director who assembles needed budget request data from
the various units and districts within the system. When the governor re-
ceives the courts' budget, hearings are held and the governor then sub-
mits to the legislature a proposed budget for all state government expen-
ditures, including those for the court system. The governor may not re-
vise the budget as proposed by the court system but may recommend
changes?6 On receipt of the governor's budget and budget proposals, the
legislature may hold hearings before adopting its final version of the
budget. In the process of budget preparation and adoption, informal dis-
cussions on budgeting issues of concern often take place between repre-
sentatives of the courts and legislators or between representatives of the
courts and the governor or persons on the governor's staff. Budgeting is
an arduous and often acrimonious process.
C. Staffing and StaffAdministration
A high volume state court system, such as that of New York, re-
quires a large bureaucracy, with many judges and even more non-judge
33. For 1999-2000, the budgeted allocation for the Court of Appeals was
$10,415,089 (including the Law Reporting Bureau) and $48,537,01l for other appellate
courts, a total of$58,952,100.See id.
The above text figure offive percent for appellate courts does not include the cost of
appellate court auxiliary operations, a number of programs such as attorney discipline,
law guardians and the State Board ofLaw Examiners, for which the appellate courts have
some responsibility and for which a total of $77,817,845 of court funds was budgeted in
1999-2000. See id.
34. Seeid.
35. See N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
36. Seeid.
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employees to operate the system. The New York court system, exclusive
of town and village courts, now has over 15,000 employees, about 1,200
of them judges,37 approximately half as many employees as the entire
federal judicial system.38 In addition, there are approximately 2,300
judges who preside at the state's town and village COurtS?9 The Court of
Appeals has seven judges and there are 425 statutorily authorized su-
preme court justices40 (the latter commonly referred to as justices rather
than as judges), fifty-six of them assigned to the appellate division~l In
addition, the number of supreme court justices is augmented by judges
from other courts, especially the Civil and Criminal Courts ofNew York
City, who are indefinitely assigned as acting supreme court justices;2
these assignments being made to circumvent a statutory cap on the num-
ber of authorized supreme court justices.43 There are more than 100 act-
ing supreme court justices.44 Other than the supreme court and town and
village courts, courts in New York State's system with the most judges
are the city courts outside New York City,45 Family COurtS,46 the Civil
37. See 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 1. For the authorized number of
judges assigned to each New York court, see id. at 3.
38. The federal judicial system has 30,641 employees (as of 1997). See
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. table 559 (1998). There are 834 federal authorized
judges in general jurisdiction courts, not including vacancies (as of 1997): 646 for district
courts, 179 for courts of appeal, and 9 for the Supreme Court, plus 86 active court of
appeals senior judges and 276 active senior district court judges. See ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1998 ANNuAL REpORT OF THE DIRECTOR 46. In addition (as
of 1998) there are 326 authorized federal bankruptcy judges, see id. at 47; 512 author-
ized magistrate judge positions, see id at 48; and a small number ofjudges assigned to the
U.S. Court of Intemational Trade or the U.S. Court ofFederal Claims.
39. See 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 3.
40. See id. The number of supreme court justices includes 56 certified retired jus-
tices. See id. Retired supreme court justices, if properly approved, may receive court
assignments or may be appointed judicial hearing officers, including as referees. See N.Y.
RULES OF CT., RULES OF THE CHIEF CT. ADMINISTRATOR pt. 122 (M:cKinney 1999).
41. In 1998, of the 56 justices assigned to the appellate division, 24 were perma-
nently authorized for that assignment and the others temporarily assigned, including 12
certificated retired supreme court justices. See 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 3.
42. These temporary assignments are made pursuant to part 121 ofthe N.Y. RuLES
OF CT., RULES OF THE CmEF CT. ADMINISTRATOR.
43. The statutory cap limits the number of authorized Supreme Court justices for
each judicial district. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 140-a (M:cKinney 1983 & Supp. 1998).
44. See Joan B. Carey, Consolidation of the State's Courts: Judge Kaye's Pro-
posal, 4 N.Y.L. Sch. CITY L. 25, 29 (1998).
45. In 1998, 158 judges. See 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 3.
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Court of New York City,47 and the Criminal Court of New York City.48
The town and village courts are unique in that the judges need not be
admitted to the bar49 and eighty percent ofthem are not lawyers.5o
As is to be expected in any large government operation that provides
a varied set of services at scattered locations over a big state, the New
York court system requires its staff to perfonn a wide range of duties. Of
these duties, the adjudicative work of judges in deciding matters before
them is the most obvious. In addition, judges have extensive administra-
tive duties, both in assuring movement of cases through the system and
overseeing other operations essential to a functioning court system. To
aid them in carrying out their duties, all judges in the New York court
system, other than many town and village court judges, have personal
clerical and secretarial assistants, immensely helpful in taking over much
of the detail work of busy chambers.51 Among the many other kinds of
court staff positions are those concentrating on infonnation processing
and distribution, personnel recruitment, staff education and training, li-
46. In 1998, 124 judges. See id.
47. In 1998, 120 judges. See id.
48. In 1998, 107 judges. See id.
49. Judges of other New York state courts must be admitted to practice law in
New York and must have, before assuming office, been admitted to practice law in New
York for five to ten years, depending on the court, prior to becoming judges. See N.Y.
CONST. art. VI, § 20(a).
50. See N.Y. ST. COMM'N ON JUD. CONDUCf, 1998 ANNuAL REpORT 8. For a gen-
erally negative analysis of the courts, with nonlawyer judges, with special attention to
Arizona, see Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Disorder in the People's Court: Rethinking the
Role on Non-Lawyer Judges in Limited Jurisdiction Court Civil Cases, 29 NEW MEx. L.
REv. 119 (1999).
51. Most every judge ofa superior court in the New York court system has a full-
time clerk. Many judges in the lower-level courts in the system have only a half-time
clerk each. See STATE OF N.Y., UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, BUDGET for April 1, 1997 to
March 31, 1998, at xxiii. By court rule, each supreme court judge is entitled to a secretary
and a law clerk, and the law clerk must be a member ofthe New York bar or a law school
graduate who expects to soon take the New York bar examination. If the clerk fails the
bar examination more than once, his or her clerk's position automatically terminates. For
the court rule on supreme court clerks and secretaries see part 5 of the N.Y. RuLES OF
CT., RULES OF THE CmEF JUDGE. Many town and village justices have no clerical assis-
tance. Provine, in a 1980s study, reports that half of the New York town and village
courts she surveyed had no clerical help. See PROVINE, supra note 24, at 126. On the
work of law clerks and how some of them view their jobs, see FMPIRE STATE COURT
NOTES 2 (Sept. 1988) and 3 (Oct. 1988).
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brary operations (the court system now has fifty-six law libraries),52
budgeting, purchasing of supplies, or security.53 Less routine is the work
of a small research staff in the court system's Center for Court hmova-
tion that provides planning and guidance for new court projects.54 The
Center has been particularly active in the planning and development ef-
forts for new specialized courts, including community courts, drug
treatment courts and domestic violence courts. The court system also has
its own legal counsel staff, lawyers who are responsible for drafting leg-
islative measures proposed by the chief judge. The counsel staff main-
tains close working relations with the state legislature and liaison with
bar associations and other private groupS.55 Although not court staff in
the usual meaning of that term, jurors are personnel important to opera-
tion of American court systems and extensively relied on in many New
York criminal and civil trials. The jury system also requires additional
staff positions and staff time. Improving the jury system has been a ma-
jor goal of the present Chief Judge56 and, in cooperation with the legis-
lature, some of her jury reform objectives have been achieved, including
drastic reduction in legally permissible exemptions from jury service.57
52. There are 39 supreme court and 13 county-level law libraries. See PROPOSED
BUDGET 2000-2001, supra note 10, at 195. The Court of Appeals and appellate division
courts also have law libraries.
53. Extensive security protection exists in most all New York courthouses due to
the risk of violence and disorderly conduct. Security personnel also help in directing
members of the public to the proper courtroom or office. For a discussion of security
risks in courthouses and types of security personnel, equipment and procedures, see Don
Hardenbergh, Justice Without Fear: Are We Safe in Our Courthouses?, 17 ST. CT. J.,
Winter 1993, at 22.
54. On the Center for Court Innovation, see 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27,
at 39-40; and PROPOSED BUDGET 2000-2001, supra note 10, at vii-viii.
55. On the role of the court system's Office of Counsel, see 1993 ANNuAL
REpORT, supra note 27, at 49; and 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 29.
56. The Chief Judge has stated the basic objectives of jury reform to be these:
"jury pools that are truly representative of the community; a system that operates effec-
tively; and jury service that is a positive experience for the half-million citizens sum-
moned each year." JUDITH S. KAYE, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 2 (1998).
57. On exemptions from jury service, see N.Y. JUD. LAW § 517 (McKinney Supp.
1998); N.Y. RULES OF COURT, RULES OF THE CHIEF CT. ADMINISTRATOR § 128.6, l28.6A,
and pt. 128, app. A (McKinney 1999).
Other recent improvements in the jury system include increased juror compensation
to $40 a day, a more rapid civil juror selection process, new and improved orientation
materials for those summoned for jury duty and improved jury assembly rooms in court-
houses. On these and other improvements, see PROPOSED BUDGET 2000-2001, supra note
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In selecting court employees and the terms of their employment,
there is considerable variation in the New York State court system,
variations depending largely on the type ofjob and type of court. Differ-
ences are particularly pronounced as to judges. How judges are selected
and the duration of their terms of office is prescribed by the New York
Constitution.58 Most trial judges are popularly elected by voters in the
local area their court serves. However, judges of the New York City
Criminal Court and the FamilX Court in New York City are appointed by
the mayor of New York City'9 and judges of the court of claims are ap-
pointed by the governor with the advice of the State Senate.60 Also, the
chief court administrator appoints New York City Housing Court judges
10, at viii-ix; N.Y. UNmEo COURT SYSTEM, JURY REFORM IN N.Y. STATE: A SECOND
PROGRESS REpORT ON ACONTINUING INITIATIVE (March 1998); Judith S. Kaye, Changing
Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How Courts Are Run, 48
HASTINGS L. REv. 851, 862-65 (1997); JUOITH S. KAYE, STATE OF TIlE JUDICIARY 7
(2000).
Improvements in the grand jury system are currently being implemented in New
York. A 32-member Grand Jury Project Committee appointed by the ChiefJudge made a
detailed study of the grand jury system in New York and issued its report with recom-
mendations in 1999. See GRAND JURY PROJECT COMMITTEE, THE GRAND JURY PROJECT (2
vols. 1999). The report claims that the committee's study is the most comprehensive
review ever made of a statewide grand jury system. See id. vol. 1, at iv. On the Grand
Jury Project and its implementation, also see PROPOSED BUOGET 2000-2001, supra note
10, at viii-ix; and JUOlTH S. KAYE, STATE OF TIlE JUOICIARY 7 (2000).
58. The N.Y. CONST. art. VI provides for judicial selection and term duration for
judges in different courts, as follows: supreme court, elected for 14-year terms,see id. at
§ 6(c); court of claims, appointed for 9-year terms, see id. at § 9; county courts, elected
for lO-year terms, see id. at § 10; surrogate's courts, in New York City elected for 14-
year terms, elsewhere elected for lO-year terms, see id. at § 12(b), (c); family courts, in
New York City appointed for 10-year terms, elsewhere elected for 10-year terms,see id.
at § 13(a); Civil Court of New York City, elected for 10-year terms, see id. at § 15(a);
Criminal Court of New York City, appointed for lO-year terms, see id.; district courts,
elected for 6-year terms, see id. at § 16(h); judges of town courts, elected for 4-year
terms, see id. at § 17(d). The New York Constitution leaves to the legislature the terms
and method of selection of village judges and judges of city courts outside New York
City. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 17(d).
An unusual feature of the New York court system is that, in a constitutional sense,
housing court judges are not judges but rather court-appointed referees. See KAYE &
LIPPMAN, supra note 11, at 5.
59. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 13(a) (for N.Y. City Fam. Ct.), § 15(a) (for N.Y.
City Crim. Ct.).
60. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
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from a list of candidates submitted by an advisory counci1.61 Even in se-
lection of judges by popular election, or perhaps particularly so given
how candidates likely to win are selected to run, political considerations
are usually important. These can include such factors as a candidate's
past political party activity and loyalty, past loyalty to a powerful politi-
cal leader, and the extent to which the candidate matches the ethnic or
racial makeup of a powerful voter bloc in the election district.
Judicial terms set by the New York Constitution for trial judges vary
from as long as fourteen years to as short as four years, with most judi-
cial terms being fourteen years or ten years.62 Judges, of course, may
succeed themselves by being elected or appointed for another term. They
also may be removed for misconduct or mental or physical disability.63
61. See N.Y. JUD. LAW, N.Y. CITY ClVlL COURT ACT § 1lO(f) (McKinney Supp.
1999). The advisory council includes, among others, members representative of the real
estate industry and tenants' organizations and one member appointed by the mayor of
New York City. See id. at § 1l0(g). Landlord influence is considerable in appointment
and reappointment of housing court judges. See Daniel Wise, A Dozen Housing Court
Judges Appointed to Landlords' Praise, N.Y. L.J., July 12,1999, at 1.
62. For duration of terms for judges of different courts, see The N.Y. CONST. art.
VI which provides for judicial selection and term duration for judges in different courts,
as follows: supreme court, elected for 14-year terms, see id. at § 6(c); court of claims,
appointed for 9-year terms, see id. at § 9; county courts, elected for 10-year terms, see id.
at § 10; surrogate's courts, in New York City elected for 14-year terms, elsewhere elected
for 10-year terms, see id. at § 12(b), (c); family courts, in New York City appointed for
10-year terms, elsewhere elected for lO-year terms, see id. at § 13(a); Civil Court ofNew
York City, elected for 10-year terms, see id. at § 15(a); Criminal Court of New York
City, appointed for lO-year terms, see id.; district courts, elected for 6-year terms, see id.
at § 16(h); judges of town courts, elected for 4-year terms, see id. at § 17(d). The New
York Constitution leaves to the legislature the terms and method of selection of village
judges and judges of city courts outside New York City. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §
17(d).
An unusual feature of the New York court system is that, in a constitutional sense,
housing court judges are not judges but rather court-appointed referees. See KAYE &
LIPPMAN, supra note 11, at 5.
supra note 58.
63. The New York Constitution has detailed provisions as to the grounds and pro-
cedures for judicial removal. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 22-24. A Commission on Judi-
cial Conduct is established to investigate and hear complaints against judges for miscon-
duct or lack of fitness to perform as a judge. See id. at § 22. The Commission may re-
move or otherwise sanction judges found unqualified, subject to review by the Court of
Appeals, and the Court of Appeals has some power to sanction judges independent of a
commission recommendation. See id. One or both houses of the legislature also may
remove or impeach judges. See id. at §§ 23, 24.
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As to the Court of Appeals, its judges, including the chiefjudge, are ap-
pointed for fourteen-year terms by the governor, with the advice and
consent of the State Senate, from among candidates proposed by a State
Commission on Judicial Nomination.64 The governor selects appellate
On the organization and powers of the Commission on Judicial Conduct also see
N.Y. JUD. LAW art. 2-A (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1999). The Commission considers
complaints of misconduct against judges in the state system, including to\'m and village
judges. In 1997 it received 1,403 new complaints, including 52 initiated by the Commis-
sion. Of the new complaints, 88% were dismissed on initial review and investigations
ordered on the others. During the year, 20 formal disciplinary orders were issued by the
Commission, 13 against town or village judges, 8 of whom were nonlawyers. Commis-
sion determinations as to the 20 judges were that 6 should be removed, 8 censured, and 6
publicly admonished. Eighteen other judges resigned prior to a Commission determina-
tion and cases against them closed. The Commission has no jurisdiction over federal
judges, housing court judges or administrative hearing officers but will review complaints
against them submitted to the Commission and, in appropriate cases, the complaints will
be referred to other agencies. On the above activity of the Commission, see N.Y. ST.
COMM'N ON JUD. CONDUCT, supra note 50, at 1-16.
Prescribed judicial rules of conduct are set forth in N.Y. RULES OF CT., RULES OF
THE CHIEF CT. ADMINISTRATOR pt. 100. An Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics,
composed ofpresent or former New York State court judges, responds to judicial inquir-
ies from judges on appropriate judicial conduct, and the responses are published. On this
committee, see id. at pt. 101. For a digest summary of some opinions of the Committee,
see EMPIRE STATE COURTNOTES 4 (Dec. 1989).
The ChiefJudge also may take action in response to judicial misconduct allegations.
For example, when allegations recently were made and widely publicized that some
judges were improperly favoring some lawyers in making fiduciary appointments, Chief
Judge Kaye announced that she would appoint a special inspector general to enforce ex-
isting court rules pertaining to such appointments, instruct administrative judges to ex-
amine fiduciary appointment practices in their localities, and would appoint a "blue rib-
bon" panel to examine the fiduciary appointment process and recommend any needed
reforms. See JUDITH S. KAYE, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 7 (2000). See also John Caher,
Kaye Directs Probe at Judicial Favoritism, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11,2000, at 1.
64. The 12-member Commission on Judicial Nomination consists offour members
appointed by the governor, four by the chiefjudge of the Court ofAppeals, and one each
by the speaker of the State Assembly, temporary president of the State Senate, minority
leader of the State Assembly, and minority leader of the State Senate. See N.Y. CONST.
art. VI, § 2(d).
On the selection ofjudges for the Court ofAppeals, also see an article by a member
of the Court, George B. Smith, Choosing Judges for a State's Highest Court, 48
SYRACUSE L. REv. 1493 (1998). Prior to a 1977 constitutional amendment, Court of Ap-
peals judges were elected. Judge Smith states that the immediate reason for the change
was to eliminate "negative aspects of politics" from the selection process; and, although
the current selection method may not have removed politics from the process, he is of the
opinion that it has worked well. See id. at 1498.
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division justices for five-year terms from among supreme court jus-
tices,65 and appellate term justices are selected by the chief court admin-
istrator with the approval of the presiding justice of the appropriate ap-
pellate division.66 As to compensation, compared to most state govern-
ment salaries, judges are well paid; but compared to earnings of more
successful lawyers in private practice, judges' earnings are low. New
Yorkjudges in all but city courts outside New York City and town and
village courts have salaries currently in the range of $119,800 to
$151,200 per year, except for the chief judge of the Court of Appeals,
who is paid $156,000 per year. These salaries are set by statute.67
Most employees of the New York court system who are not judges
are covered by New York's Civil Service Law and by detailed Ru1es of
the Chief Judge as to selection, promotion, and termination, consistent
with the Civil Service Law.68 Collective bargaining agreements have
been negotiated by the court system with most nonjudicial employee
units.69 Many nonjudicial positions in the courts, when vacant, are filled
by examination, and promotion of a present employee to a higher posi-
tion may require a promotion examination.70 In recruiting competent
staff, an added objective of the court system has for some time been in-
creased diversity of the court workforce and elimination of underrepre-
sentation of minorities and women in that workforce where it exists. A
Workforce Diversity Program has been aggressively pushed in attempts
65. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 4(c).
66. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 8(a).
67. For salaries paid judges in various courts, see article 7-B of the New York Ju-
diciary Law, as amended. Even with substantial 1999 increases, salaries of New York
judges are not much above what beginning associates in the big New York City law firms
are being paid. A further indication of the disparity in earnings ofjudges and some law-
yers in private practice is disclosed by a recent report on income of the 100 law firms in
the United States with the most lawyers per firm. This report shows the average profit per
equity partner in these 100 firms to have been $622,000 in 1998. See AM. LAW., July
1999, at 127. Of the 100 law firms included in the study, 32 have New York City offices
and the average 1998 compensation for all partners in each of these 32 firms varies from
a top of$3,105,000 per partner to a low of$240,000 per partner. See id. at 134.
68. See N.Y. RULES OF CT., RULES OF THE CmEF JunGE pt. 25 (McKinney 1999).
The deputy chief administrative judge for management support has broad powers to ap-
point many court system nonjudicial employees. See id. at pt 81, § 81.1(c)(5).
69. On these agreements and their implementation, see the Historical Note fol-
lowing section 37 ofthe Judiciary Law.
70. See N.Y. RULES OF CT., RULES OF THE CmEF JunGE pt. 25 § 25.13-25.15
(McKinney 1999).
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to further the diversity objective?l Salaries, obviously another very im-
portant personnel consideration, are set for most nonjudicial court em-
ployees by Rilles of the Chief Court Administrator; salaries vary with
grade and years of service, and show modest annual increases in recent
years.72
The administrative organizational structure of the New York State
courts consists of a complex network of administrative officials, headed
by the chief judge of the Court of Appeals, who in addition to her re-
sponsibilities for deciding cases also has substantial administrative re-
sponsibilities for the entire court system that are very demanding?3 As
not only nominal but de facto head of the system, a fully committed chief
judge will oversee court operations and initiate and push for needed re-
forms in the court system, in addition to deciding cases?4 The chief
judge's immediate administrative subordinate is the chief administrative
judge, a full-time administrator with statewide authority;7S and reporting
directly to him are four full-time deputy chief administrative judges: one
who oversees the administration of courts in New York City; one who
oversees the courts outside ofNew York City; one for management sup-
port, with general supervisory responsibility for a miscellany of court
service units necessary to a functioning court system; and one recently
added to increase availability ofthe courts to the poor?6 The deputy chief
71. On the Workforce Diversity program of the courts, see 1996 ANNUAL REpORT,
supra note 27, at 11-12; JUDITH S. KAYE, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 32-35 (1993);
EMPIRE STATE COURT NOTES, WORKFORCE DIVERSITY PROGRAM LAUNCHED, Feb. 1990,
at 1.
72. On recent nonjudicial salary schedules for different grades and years of service
for certain nonjudicial court employees, see N.Y. RULES OF CT., RULES OF THE CHIEF CT.
ADMINISTRATOR pt. 107 (McKinney 1999).
73. On the administrative functions ofthe chiefjudge, see N.Y. JUD. LAW § 211.
74. The top state court judges in other states also often assumes extensive admin-
istrative and court reform obligations in addition to their case adjudication duties. E.g., on
the work of a recent New Jersey Chief Justice, see Ronald J. Fleury et aI., How Wi/entz
Changed the Courts, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 411 (1997).
75. On the responsibilities ofthe chief administrative judge, see N.Y. JUD. LAW §§
212,216.
76. The chief administrative judge and the deputy chief administrative judge posi-
tions traditionally have been filled by judges but nonjudges could be selected to fill them.
See N.Y. JUD. LAW, § 210(3) (McKinney 1983); N.Y. RULES OF CT., RULES OF THE CHIEF
JUDGE pt. 80, § 80.2(a) (McKinney 1999). Also, the N.Y. CoNST. art. VI, § 28, refers
merely to a "chief administrator of the courts," indicating that a nonlawyer could hold
this position. Many ofthe other more important court administrative positions in the New
York court system are held by nonlawyers.
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administrative judge for management support is responsible for those
service units pertaining to court facilities management, administrative
services,77 human resources,7S information technology, and fmancial
management and auditing services. The counsel to the court system also
reports to the chiefadministrative judge.
The chief administrative judge is appointed by the chief judge, with
the advice and consent of the Administrative Board of the Courts, the
latter consisting of the chief judge and the presiding judge of each ap-
pellate division department.79 Pursuant to a constitutional directive,so the
chief judge, by court rule, has delegated extensive powers to the chief
administrative judge and the deputy chief administrative judges.S! How-
ever, judges of the appellate division and appellate terms of the supreme
court are largely responsible for the administration of their courts, the
chief administrative judge's powers and duties in relation to these courts
Nationally, court administration is becoming a separate profession. Indications of
this are that graduate judicial administration programs are now being offered at the Uni-
versity of Southern California, American University and the University of Denver; con-
tinuing education programs are offered by the Institute of Court Management; and there
are associations of court managers, the National Association of Court Management and
the Conference of State Court Administrators. On court administration as a separate pro-
fession, see Harry O. Lawson & Dennis E. Howard, Development of the Profession of
Court Management: A History with Commentary, 15 JUST. SYs. J. 580 (1991). The new
profession is influenced by organization and administration theories developed by busi-
ness schools and schools ofpublic administration. See id.
For a nationwide statistical survey of state and local court managers as of 1989, see
David J. Saari et. aI., The Modern Court Managers: Who They Are and What They Do in
the United States, in STEVEN W. HAyS & COLE B. GRAHAM, JR., HANDBOOK OF COURT
ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT 237 (1993).
77. An Office of Administrative Services provides a wide range of services, in-
cluding central purchasing, central accounting, attorney registration administration, cen-
tralized printing, and maintenance of official records. See PROPOSED BUDGET 1999-2000,
supra note 10, at 341-42.
78. A Division of Human Resources, under the general direction of the ChiefAd-
ministrative Judge for Management Support, includes the following offices: Education
and Training, Employee Relations, Workforce Diversity, Personnel, Payroll, Employee
Benefits, and Career Services. See id. at 339. On other divisions and offices under the
general direction ofthe Deputy ChiefAdministrative Judge for Management Support, see
id.338-40.
79. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 28(a). The chiefadministrative judge holds office at
the pleasure ofthe chiefjudge. See id.
80. See id. at § 28(b).
81. See N.Y. RULES OF CT., RULES OF THE CmEF JUDGEpts. 1,80 & 81 (McKinney
1999).
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being sharply limited.82 Although substantial administrative oversight of
New York trial courts is centralized in the chief judge and top adminis-
trative judges, considerable responsibility for managing the administra-
tive details of court operations remains at the trial court level. To assist in
this process, the New York City Criminal Court, New York City Civil
Court, Family Court, and each of the twelve judicial districts has an ad-
ministrative judge.83 Some efforts have been made recently to decentral-
ize more aspects ofpersonnel management, budget preparation, and day-
to-day fiscal management.84
An important added feature ofNew York State courts' organizational
structure is the frequent use of committees as administrative and deci-
sion-making aids.85 Most are court appointed, usually by the chiefjudge.
Some make binding decisions; most merely recommend action. Some are
permanent; some are temporary and terminate following their final re-
port. Some of these bodies consist solely of court personnel; some in-
clude court personnel and outsiders; and some include only outsiders.
The outsiders in many instances are lawyers in private practice who are
particularly knowledgeable about the subjects under consideration. An
advantage to use of these bodies is the expertise they bring to the review
and analysis of troublesome issues; and frequently, as well, the reputa-
tion and credibility of their members make committee conclusions and
recommendations more broadly acceptable and more readily imple-
82. See id. at § 80.3. The appellate division judges also have responsibility for su-
pervising the administration and operation of a number ofprograms, including admission
to the bar, lawyer discipline, and regulation of the practice oflaw. See id. at § 80.3(c). On
these auxiliary operations, also see PROPOSED BUDGET, supra note 10, at 263-339.
83. See NEW YORK RULES OF CT., RULES OF THE CHIEF JUDGE § 80.2(a)(I)
(McKinney 1999), for authorization of these administrative judges. There also are sepa-
rate administrative judges for Nassau County and Suffolk County. See id. at § 80.2(a)(2).
The presiding judge of the court of claims is the administrative judge for that court See
id. at § 80.3(c).
84. See JUDITH S. KAYE, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 32 (1993). Concerns over
undue administrative unification or centralization of the courts have been expressed, in-
cluding that these moves may ignore local needs, values and interests and may stifle local
initiative. On these and other concerns as to unification and centralization of court ad-
ministration, see Hany O. Lawson, State Court System Unification, 31 AM. U. L. REv.
273, 286-87 (1982).
85. These bodies may officially be referred to as committees or as task forces,
commissions, councils, conferences, or panels.
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mented.86 In addition, committees made up ofjudges and other court per-
sonnel can help build staff morale by creating a sense of inclusion in
policy making rather than a feeling of being dictated to by others.
Among recent court staffed or appointed committee-type bodies estab-
lished to study and make recommendations on difficult issues facing the
courts are the Grand Jury Project Committee, Commercial Courts Task
Force, Committee on Case Management, Committee on Alternative
Criminal Sanctions, Franklin H. Williams Judicial Commission on Mi-
norities, Alternative Dispute Resolution Task Force, and Individual As-
signment Review Committee.87 In addition, there are advisory commit-
tees to the chief administrative judge, staffed by the court counsel, that
work with the court counsel in preparing legislation of concern to the
court system for submission to the legislature. Most advisory committee
members are lawyers in private practice specializing in a relevant field of
law.88 The legislature has also created permanent committees, solely or
largely composed of judges, to assist in judicial administration: the Ad-
ministrative Board of the COurts,89 the Judicial Conference,90 and judicial
86. Somewhat analogous efforts to improve the court system by drawing on the
knowledge and influence of a wide range ofpersons in the justice community is the Los
Angeles Superior Court Improvement Initiative. Los Angeles, of course, is a high popu-
lation, high court caseload area similar to a number ofcounties in the State ofNew York.
Through collaborative exchange of information and ideas by many persons concerned
with the courts, the Initiative has sought to identify ways of improving the local courts
and then focusing on actions necessary to implement the improvements. Task force
meetings, stakeholder conferences, polling, surveys and interviews are among the proce-
dures used. On the Initiative, see Bryan Borys et aI., Enlisting the Justice Community in
Court Improvement, 82 JUDICATURE 176 (1999).
87. Among the many other recent court staffed or appointed committees concerned
with serious court-related problems are the Family Violence Task Force, Permanent Judi-
cial Commission on Justice for Children, Judicial Advisory Councils, The Jury Project
Panel, Judicial Commission on Women in the Courts, Pro-Bono Monitoring Committee,
and Committee on the Profession and the Courts, and Commission on Drugs and the
Courts.
88. There are separate advisory committees on civil practice, criminal law and
procedure, family court, local courts and surrogate's court. If the chief administrative
judge approves committee legislative proposals, they are then submitted to the legislature
for consideration. The advisory committees also review other legislative proposals of
special concern to the court system and their recommendations on this legislation, if ap-
proved by the chiefcourt administrator, will be taken up with the legislature and the gov-
ernor's counsel by court counsel. On the advisory committees and their proposals and
recommendations in 1998, see 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 46-52.
89. This Board consists of the chiefjudge and the presiding judges ofthe appellate
division courts, and advises the chiefjudge on selection of the chief court administrator.
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associations.91
Another administrative format utilized by the New York State courts
is the separate administrative center that helps carry out an important
court function. One such center is the City, Town and Village Courts
Resource Center that answers questions from city, town or village judges
or their clerks on the law or on administrative issues. Responses to in-
quiries about the law are particularly helpful as many judges at this court
level are not lawyers. Since its inception in 1990, the Center has an-
swered over 50,000 inquiries.92 Community Dispute Resolution Centers
are another example of this type of administrative format. There are a
number of these centers, located throughout the state, that informallr
resolve conflicts, many of which might otherwise go to the courts?
Quite different are Children's Centers, a recent innovation. These centers
care for children when their adult caregivers are attending court sessions,
thereby eliminating the problem of children in courtrooms. Fourteen
courts now have Children's Centers and they care for almost 40,000
children each year. The Children's Centers are operated by not-for-profit
agencies under contract with the court system.94
It also has some responsibility for establishing court administrative standards and policies
and rules of practice and procedure in the courts. See N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 210, 213
(McKinney 1983). The Board is also a constitutional body. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI §
28(a).
90. The Judicial Conference, chaired by the chiefjudge, consists ofrepresentatives
from the various courts in the state, plus one member of the bar of the state and desig-
nated members of the state legislature. It recommends changes in the law and advises on
court staff education and other matters. See N.Y. JUD. LAw §§ 214, 214(a) (McKinney
1983 & Supp. 1998).
91. There is a judicial association for each court composed of the judges of that
court. Each association meets at least annually and designates one ofits members to con-
sult with the chief judge and chief court administrator on court administrative policies.
See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 217 (McKinney Supp. 1998).
92. On the City, Town and Village Courts Resource Center, see PROPOSED
BUDGET 2000-2001, supra note 10, at 206.
93. On Community Dispute Resolution Centers, see infra note 128 and accompa-
nyingtext.
94. On Children's Centers, see JUDITH S. KAYE & JONATHAN LIPPMAN, FAMILY
JUSTICE PROGRAM 39 (1997); N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, THE STATE OF THE
JUDIClARY7 (1996).
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D. Caseloads and Case Management
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The volume of cases before New York State courts is tremendous
and has been increasing, especially at the trial court level. New case fil-
ings in the trial courts of the New York State court system, excluding
town and village court filings, are almost four million annually, far more
than all the federal trial courts in the nation combined.95 The highest vol-
ume New York trial courts, each with over 300,000 new filings in a re-
cent reporting year, are New York City Criminal Court, family courts
(statewide), civil term of the supreme court (statewide), New York City
Housing Court, and city and district courts outside New York City.96
Case dispositions in anyone year are roughly equivalent to new filings?7
The breakdown of dispositions by court type in 1997 was 44% in crimi-
nal courts, 34% in civil courts, 19% in family courts, and 3% in surro-
gate's COurtS.98 Total case filings in the New York trial courts have been
moving up but increases in recent years have been most substantial in
criminal court filings.99 In addition to the above-mentioned trial court
95. Excluding town and village court cases, in 1998 there were 3,543,795 new
cases filed and calendared in the New York state court system; other than parking and
traffic cases there were 2,993,517 such cases. See 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27,
at 9. The total federal district court filings for the same year were 314,478. See 1998
ANNUAL REpORT OF THE DIRECTOR, supra note 38, at 16. Of these federal filings,
256,787 were civil cases, 57,691 were criminal cases. See id. In addition, in 1998, there
were 1,436,964 bankruptcy court filings, see id.; 1,105 U.S. court of federal claims fil-
ings, see id. at 287; and 3,575 U.S. court of international trade filing~ see id. at 286.
Federal trial court case filings are increasing. From 1994 to 1998, U.S. district court civil
case filings were up 8.6%; U.S. district court criminal case filings were up 26.8%; bank-
ruptcy court filings were up 71.5%. See id. at 16. The U.S. Courts ofAppeals had 53,805
cases filed in 1998, up 11.3% since 1994. See id.
96. In 1998 the new filings for the following high volume New York courts were
these: New York City Criminal Court, 703,689 cases, including both arrest and summons
cases; family courts (statewide), 654,602 cases; Civil Term of the Supreme Court (state-
wide), 385,797 cases (Criminal Term of Supreme and County Courts, 63,329 cases); and
city and district courts outside New York City, 240,917 cases. See 1998 ANNuAL REPORT,
supra note 27, at 9.
97. E.g., in 1998 there were 3,560,812 cases disposed of by the New York State
court system, compared to the 3,543,795 new cases filed. See id. This does not include
town and village court cases.
98. See id.
99. E.g., comparative filing figures for 1988 and 1998 are these, not including
town and village courts: criminal courts, 730,625 in 1988, 1,069,772 in 1998; civil courts,
1,001,734 in 1990, 1,101,871 in 1998; family court, 486,946 in 1988, 654,602 in 1998;
and surrogate's court, 120,750 in 1988, 167,272 in 1998. Traffic and parking ticket cases
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case filings and dispositions, approximately two million minor criminal
and civil cases are filed and disposed of each year in New York town and
village courts.IOO Many of these are parking and traffic offense matters.
Although case filings in New York are high, the percentage of cases
that go to trial is small, most criminal cases being disposed of by guilty
pleas or dismissals101 and most civil cases by settlements, dismissals, or
defaultjudgments.102 However, all cases disposed ofwithout trial require
input of court staff time, often very considerable time. Required may be
such judicial actions as preliminary hearings, responses to motions of
parties, conferences with attorneys, and issuance of summary judgments
or default judgments. Adequate records also must be kept of cases filed.
Obviously, too, the amount ofcourt personnel time, judicial and nonjudi-
cial, can vary tremendously among individual cases and types of cases
whether or not tried or disposed ofwithout trial. For instance, a complex
tort case or well-publicized murder case, whether tried or not, nonnally
will take far more court personnel time and effort than the typical tenant
eviction or traffic offense case. Clearly, annual case filing and disposi-
tion statistics are only partial indicators ofcaseload burdens on courts.
Compared to the volume of case dispositions by New York trial
are not included. On the above case filing data, see 1989 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27,
at 12, for 1988; 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 9, for 1998.
100. See JUDITH S. KAYE, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 6 (1995).
101. E.g., in 1998 there were 66,835 felony cases disposed of statewide in New
York by Supreme and County Courts but trials commenced in only 4,282 cases. See
PROPOSED BUDGET 2000-2001, supra note 10, at 32. Of the felony cases disposed ofthat
year, 85% were disposed of by guilty pleas, 7% by dismissals, 5% by jury verdicts, and
1% by other means. See 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 14 & 15. Among courts
oflimited jurisdiction, the Criminal Court ofNew York City disposed of 676,014 cases in
1998, 50% by guilty pleas, 36% by dismissals, 0.2% by jury verdicts, and the remainder
by other means. See id. at 17.
For a discussion of high caseloads in criminal cases and alternative models for
dealing with the high caseload problem, see Jerold H. Israel, Excessive Criminal Justice
Caseloads: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, 48 FLA. L. REv. 761 (1996). Profes-
sor Israel concludes: ''What is needed are some hard policy choices as to what exactly we
want from our criminal justice enforcement process and some hard data as to what it
would take to achieve these goals." Id. at 779.
102. E.g., in 1998, there were 205,889 civil matters disposed ofby the New York
supreme court. See 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 11. Of these, 14% were set-
tled before trial note of issue was filed, 52% disposed by other pre-note means (e.g., dis-
missal, default or consolidation), 22% by settlement after note of issue filed, only 4%
disposed ofby verdict or decision, and 7% disposed ofpost note of issue by other means.
Seeid.
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courts, the volume of cases disposed of by New York appellate courts is
very small. In New York, as in other American court systems, relatively
few trial court matters are appealed, so the vast proportion of litigated
cases are resolved at the trial court level. That said, the caseload of New
York appellate courts is high relative to that of appellate courts in most
states.103 In a recent year, 1997, appellate division courts disposed of
over 18,000 appeals, appellate term over 2,300, and the Court ofAppeals
260.104 Over the past decade or so, annual dispositions of appealed cases
by the Court of Appeals and appellate term courts have remained rela-
tively constant, but those of appellate division courts have increased con-
siderably.los
The massive and expanding caseload burdens on New York State
courts have lead to a variety of case management approaches being
adopted in attempts to better resolve the problems huge caseloads have
created given insufficient court personnel to provide optimal court con-
103. E.g., in 1997, New York total appellate court filings were more than any state
except California, Florida and Texas. See B. OSTROM & N. KAUDER, EXAMINING THE
WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1997, A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS
PROJECT (National Center for State Courts) 79 (1998).
104. In 1998, the exact number of appellate division appeals disposed of was
19,227 ofwhich 6,680 were disposed ofbefore argument or submission (e.g., dismissed,
withdrawn or settled) and 12,547 were disposed of after argument or submission (e.g.,
dismissed, withdrawn, settled), 8,218 of them affirmed, 1,696 reversed, 1,121 modified,
1,037 dismissed, and 475 other. See 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 6. Compa-
rable figures in 1998 for supreme court appellate term appeals are 2,064 appeals disposed
of, 787 of them before argument or submission (e.g., dismissed, withdrawn, settled) and
1,277 disposed of after argument or submission, 620 of them affirmed, 426 reversed, 170
modified, 51 dismissed and 10 other. See id. at 7. Of the 198 appeals decided by the
Court of Appeals in 1998, 124 were civil cases, 74 were criminal cases. See id. at 5. Of
the criminal cases, approximately 46% were affirmed, 22% reversed, 1% modified, and
5% dismissed; of the civil cases, 50% were affirmed, 15% reversed, 8% modified, 1%
dismissed after argument, and 20% other. See 1998 ANNuAL REpORT OF THE CLERK OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS, at 5.
105. E.g., in 1988, the Court of Appeals disposed of369 cases (appeals decided),
appellate division courts, 13,225 cases, and appellate term courts, 2,124 cases. See 1989
ANNUAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 25-27. Compare these figures with those for 1998.
See 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 104.
For an analysis of appellate division caseloads, see Spiros A. Tsimbinos, The State
ofAppellate Division Case/oads, N.Y. ST. B.J., Jan. 1998, at 33. Caseload pressures on
appellate division courts have recently eased somewhat, largely due to more extensive
use by prosecutors of waiver of appeal as a condition to plea bargains and sentencing
agreements in criminal cases. See id. at 34.
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sideration in all cases.I06 These problems include how to avoid unaccept-
able delay in moving cases through the system, and in an overloaded
system, what cases merit preference and what kind of preference. Dila-
tory tactics by some litigants or their lawyers frequently contribute to
case delay problems. Case management, as broadly perceived, includes
efforts to reduce case delay risks by imposing caseflow regulations to
force or at least encourage timely movement of cases through the court
system; adopting automated case information systems so that progress of
cases through the court system is readily ascertainable by relevant court
officials; frequent efforts by judges to encourage parties to settle; and
developing court-related programs for moving some cases out of the tra-
ditional court system into other dispute resolution centers.I07
A form of case management that is increasingly being resorted to by
some New York courts is protracted judicial oversight of individual cases
in an effort to resolve more satisfactorily, with less frequent recidivism,
the underlying personal or family problems that brought the parties into
court. Typical of problems dealt with by this approach are drug addic-
tion, domestic violence and juvenile delinquency,lOS Usually in this ap-
proach the judge cooperates closely with others in the attempt to achieve
106. On what case management is and what it attempts to accomplish, see ABA
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, VOL. 2, Relating to Trial Courts § 2.51 (1992);
and Maureen M. Solomon, Fundamental Issues in CasejIow Management, in HAyS &
GRAHAM, supra note 76, at 369.
107. A peripheral aspect of case management, but a matter of importance in the
operation of courts, is civility of lawyers, judges, and court personnel in their relations
with one another and others, both in and out of the courtroom. This was considered a
sufficiently serious problem that Chief Judge Kaye and other top administrative judges
recently issued guidelines, distributed in pamphlet form, as to how lawyers, judges, and
court personnel should behave. See JUDITH S. KAYE ET AL., STANDARDS OF CIVILITY
(1997). On civility also see a recent article by a New York Supreme Court Justice, Caro-
lyn E. Demarest, Civility in the Courtroom from a Judge's Perspective, N.Y. ST. B.J.,
May-June 1997, at 24; and a companion article by a practicing lawyer, John S. Smith,
Civility in the Courtroom from a Litigator's Perspective, id. at 28.
108. The Midtown Community Court is a leading example of a court based on the
community justice center concept. Minor criminal offenses are considered by this court
and sentences often involve some kind ofcommunity service. Somewhat similar commu-
nity justice centers will be opened soon in Harlem and in Red Hook, Brooldyn. Among
the new centers' sentencing options are community service, letters of apology and at-
tending anger management workshop sessions. These two courts also have jurisdiction
over some landlord-tenant matters. There is also a community court in the Village of
Hempstead. On New York community centers, see PROPOSED BUDGET, supra note 10, at
170-71; JUDITH S. KAYE, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 3 (2000); and Jonathan Lippman, New
Approach Put to the Test, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 2000, at S1.
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corrective goals, others such as social workers, treatment centers, com-
munity service agencies, and the police, as well as with counsel for the
parties, if represented. This form ofjudicial involvement is a shift away
from the traditional judicial adversary model to a team-based problem-
solving model, with courts monitoring compliance, rewarding progress
and sanctioning infractions.109 This model, however, usually results in
added net financial cost to the court system, unlike more typical case
management approaches, and obtaining needed financing can be diffi-
cult.110
In its case management efforts to encourage timely movement of
cases through the trial court system, the New York state courts have
adopted guidelines, referred to as standards and goals, in addition to the
typical procedural deadlines lawyers are expected to meet during the
course of litigation. The usual procedural rules set time frames for law-
yers, but lawyers commonly fail to comply with prescribed deadlines
without objection from their opponents.III Judges, not just lawyers, have
109. On Judge Kaye's view as to the merits of this team-based problem solving
approach, see Judith S. Kaye, Lawyering for a New Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 4-6
(1998), discussing drug treatment courts; and Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times,
supra note 57, at 857-62, discussing the Midtown Community Court and family court.
Although she obviously considers the problem-solving team approach highly desirable,
she does raise questions about it: "What are the limits of a court as a therapeutic agent?
At what point do we cease being a court of law and become a social service agency?" Id.
at 862.
Drug treatment courts and community courts are among the team-based, problem
solving courts that are being established in a number of other states, in addition to New
York. On drug courts, see Special Issue, Swift and Effective Justice: New Approaches to
Drug Cases in the States, 17 JusT.SYs.J.l (1994); Sam Torres & Elizabeth P. Deschenes,
Changing the System and Making It Work: The Process ofImplementing Drug Courts in
Los Angeles County, 19 JUST.SYS.J. 267 (1997). On community courts in some other
jurisdictions, see Gordon Bazemore, The "Community" in Community Justice: Issues,
Themes, and Questions for the New Neighborhood Sanctioning Models, 19 JUST. SYS. J.
193 (1997).
110. Funding from sources other than state govermnent may be available to help
fund problem-solving model courts. For example, drug treatment courts have received
substantial financial assistance from federal govermnent grants. See PROPOSED BUDGET
2000-2001, supra note 10, at 174-75.
111. Felony prosecutions in New York City are a type of case in which case flow
delay has become particularly serious. To look into this problem a Trial Readiness Proj-
ect was started and a court-appointed task force, including prosecutors and defense coun-
sel, was asked to make proposals. The task force proposed creating pilot programs to test
new approaches to reducing delays in felony cases, including earlier discovery by prose-
cutors, more prompt pretrial motions by defense lawyers, strict deadlines for pleas, and
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a responsibility for timely caseflow and, especially in courts with high
case volumes, judges often have been delinquent in fulfilling their re-
sponsibility. Standards and goals are indicators of when judges are not
adequately supervising caselaw movement. They set time frames for case
progress and case disposition, with different time frames for different
kinds of cases.ll2 A record of adherence to standards and goals is regu-
larly reported and is a performance guide to trial judges and administra-
tive judges. Compliance with the time frame guidelines, however, has
been disappointing.ll3 Another significant case management approach of
the New York trial courts conducive to improved caseflow is the indi-
vidual assignment system. This system has been in effect since 1986 in
most New York trial courts of superior jurisdiction and some trial courts
of lesser jurisdiction.114 With certain exceptions, it requires that every
case be assigned to a judge soon after filing and remain with that judge
until final disposition. This one-judge-per-case requirement seeks to
fixed dates for hearings and trials. On the Trial Readiness Project, see JUDITH S. KAYE,
THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 3-4 (1998); KAYE & LIPPMAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
PROGRAM, supra note 10, at 17-18.
112. The standards and goals for civil cases have different time frames for differ-
ent stages in the litigation process and for different kinds of cases. The stages are (1)
from initial filing (the point at which the parties seek some form ofjudicial relief) to fil-
ing a note of issue (indicating readiness for trial), (2) from the time of filing the note of
issue to disposition, and (3) the time of the entire proceeding from initial filing to dispo-
sition. For noncomplex civil cases (including most tort and contract cases), the time
frames for completing the above stages in a proceeding are 12 months for the first, 15
months for the second and 27 months for the third. For complex cases (e.g., medical mal-
practice cases), the periods for the three stages are 15, 15, and 30 months. Somewhat
different time periods also apply to matrimonial and tax certiorari cases. On standards
and goals for civil cases, see 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 10. In felony cases
dispositions must occur, under the standards and goals, within 6 months from filing ofthe
indictment. See id. at 14.
113. Statewide in 1997, only 52% of pending civil cases met the standards and
goals pre-note time requirement, 76% met the note of issue to disposition requirement,
and 76% met the overall filing to disposition requirement. See 1997 ANNUAL REpORT,
supra note 27, at 10. In 1997, only 81% of felony cases met the six-month disposition
requirement. See id. at 14. The failure of so many cases to adhere to the standards and
goals time frames is one reason for the new Comprehensive Civil Justice Program. On
that program, see KAYE & LIPPMAN, infra note 135, and accompanying text.
114. For individual assignment system requirements, see the following sections of
N.Y. RULES OF CT., UNIFORM RULES FOR N.Y. STATE TRIAL CTs. (McKinney 1999): §
200.11(a), criminal actions in supreme court and county court; § 202.3, civil actions and
proceedings in supreme court and county court; § 205.3, family court; § 206.3, court of
claims; § 210.3, civil actions and proceedings in city courts outside New York City.
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avoid delays and wasteful expenditures of judicial time when different
trial judges are assigned to different aspects of a particular case, thereby
necessitating duplication of judicial effort to become familiar with the
case. ll5
Effective case management requires accurate and detailed informa-
tion on every case before the courts in the particular jurisdiction, infor-
mation that should be kept very current and quickly and easily available
to all persons with authorized access. The information also should be
organized pursuant to uniform specifications so as to enable meaningful
case comparisons and case volume analyses. A modem case information
system of this kind requires a high degree of data automation if the sys-
tem is to be sufficiently comprehensive and economically feasible.1l6 The
New York State courts have made great progress in the expensive proc-
ess of developing automated information systems but more needs to be
done and is planned.ll7
Most court chambers, other than those of many town and village
courts, make extensive use of computer technology in recording, tracking
and reporting on case progress; and centralized automated systems proc-
115. A Review Committee on the Individual Assignment System in the Civil Term
of the Supreme Court studied all facets of the system and in 1992 reported favorably on
how the system was operating. The committee did, however, make a number of recom-
mendations for improvements in case processing and other trial procedures, some of
which have been adopted. On the Review Committee and its recommendations, see
ACTING CmEF JUDGE RICHARD D. SIMONS, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 6-12 (1992);
JUDITHS. KAYE, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 27-28 (1993).
116. On the essentials of a state-of-the-art automated information system, see
ABA, STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, vol. 1, §§ 1.60-1.64 (1990); vol. 2, §§
2.81-2.84; and vol. 3, §§ 3.90-3.94 (1994).
117. For a summation of information and records management by the New York
trial courts, see 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 31; JUDITH S. KAYE, THE STATE
OF THE JUDICIARY 31-32 (1999). Also see a report of a court appointed committee, 1HE
REpORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATION AND TECHNOLOGY (1995). On centralized
data processing operations that process thousands of transactions daily by New York trial
courts and court administrative offices, see 1996 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 15.
An experimental computer-integrated courtroom is now available for use by the
Commercial Division of the New York Supreme Court, particularly useful in complex
litigation. This courtroom has video equipment, a computerized blackboard and personal
monitors for the judge and other trial participants. On this courtroom, see JuDITH S.
KAYE, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 16 (1998). Pilot programs are also being considered for
commencing some actions and filing some court papers by fax and e-mail. See id. at 32.
On present and prospective technologies useful to courts, see Technology Sympo-
sium, What's New in Court Technology, 32 JUDGES' J., (Summer 1993).
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ess a vast volume of case data each day, data used for many purposes,
including statistical summaries and analyses of case activity essential to
centralized case management.ll8 A telecommunication network (Court-
Net) links together many state courts and administrative agencies on
matters of mutual concern and with laptop and desktop computers in-
creasingly available to judges and support staff.ll9 Also, the Data Case
System, which recently went into operation, for a modest fee enables
lawyers and other members ofthe public with requisite software to check
from their offices progress of any civil case before the Supreme Court in
any of the larger counties of the state.120 Much needs to be done to make
New York State court information systems of maximum utility and fully
state-of-the-art, but much has already been accomplished.
A very different form of court-involved case management is court-
related alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Conciliation, mediation,
and arbitration are frequent means used to resolve disputes. ADR is the
use of these means with the participation of neutral third parties, other
than or in addition to judges, in attempts to resolve disputes. Concilia-
tion, mediation and arbitration commonly occur without any judicial
participation. However, judges may become involved in diverting cases
into one of these other means of resolution. If, in doing so, the courts
retain considerable supervisory control over the process and over the
neutral third parties, this is known as "court-annexed" ADR. The term
"court-referred" ADR is used to denote such diversions in which the
court retains little or no supervisory contro1.121 Benefits claimed for
court-related ADR are that it will accelerate case dispositions, save
judges' time, and reduce litigation costs for the court system and for liti-
gants. Available data on these claims is mixed, but some ADR rrograms
obviously are achieving one or more of these claimed benefits.12
118. There are plans for the state to provide 750 town and village courts with cost
effective access to automated databases. See PROPOSED BUDGET 1999-2000, supra note
12, at xxvi-xxvii.
119. On CourtNet see JUDITH S. KAYE, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 31 (1999)
and PROPOSED BUDGET 2000-2001, supra note 10, at 210.
120. On the Data Case System, see id. at 17 (1998).
121. On court-annexed and court-referred ADR, see ABA, STANDARDS OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, vol. 1, § 1.12.5 (1990).
122. For a discussion of studies evaluating the effectiveness of court-related ADR,
see Susan L. KeiIitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Courts, in HAyS & GRAHAM,
supra note 76, 383 at 392-94 & 397-99, and a symposium on Court-Annexed Arbitration,
14 JUSTICE SYS. J. 123 (1991). Also see Samuel Krislov & Paul Kramer, 20120 Vision:
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Court-related ADR has had only modest adoption by the New York
court system but adoptions are increasing, some of them as pilot pro-
grams.123 City and district courts in thirty-one counties operate a manda-
tory arbitration program for smaller amount damage claims, and about
10,000 cases a year are disposed of under this program.124 The Supreme
Court in several counties has mandatory ADR requirements, including
the New York County Commercial Division of the Supreme Court.125 A
mediation program also exists in family courts, that engages in mediation
of about 2,400 cases a year, with an eighty percent settlement rate, con-
centrating on visitation, custody, and support;126 and a housing court me-
diation program recently was instituted in New York City.l21 There also
are Community Dispute Resolution Centers throughout the state, largely
funded by the state, which through informal conciliation efforts seek to
resolve conflicts, many of a minor criminal nature that otherwise would
be handled by the criminal justice system.12S Chief Judge Kaye has rec-
ognized that ADR is controversial and raises difficult questions but she
The Future ofthe California Civil Courts, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1915,1940 (1993), assert-
ing that coercive use ofADR is threatening to weaken litigants' rights by depriving them
ofdue process and other procedural protections.
123. For a report on ADR in New York as of 1998, see STATE ADR OFFICE,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE REsOLUTION PROGRAMS INN.Y. STATE (1998).
124. See 1996 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 29,31. The arbitration program
applies only to cases in which recovery sought for each cause ofaction is $6,000 or less,
or $10,000 or less in the Civil Court of the City of New York. See N.Y. RULES OF CT.,
RULES OF THE CHIEF JunGE § 28.2(b) (McKinney 1999).
125. On supreme court ADR, see supra note 123, at 1-11, and on the New York
County commercial division's ADR program also see Haig, supra note 14, at 200.
126. See STATE ADR OFFICE, supra note 123, at 18. On family court ADR, also
see KAYE & LIPPMAN, FAMILY LAW PROGRAM PHASE TWO, supra note 10, at 38-39.
127. See KAYE & LIPPMAN, supra note 11, at 11.
128. These centers are established by N.Y. Jun. LAW § 849-b (McKinney 1992).
They are administered and supervised under the direction ofthe chief court administrator.
See id. Requirements that a center must meet to be eligible for funding from the state are
set forth in part 116 of the New York Rules of Court, Rules of the Chief Court Adminis-
trator. On the centers, also see STATE ADR OFFICE, supra note 123, at 17. In 1998 the
centers conducted over 22,000 conciliations, mediations and arbitrations; 77% of the
cases reaching the mediation stage were resolved by voluntary agreement between the
parties. See id. Almost half the cases considered by the centers were referred to the cen-
ters by the courts. See id.
On the community-based justice concept, see Lawrence B. Solum,Alternative Court
Structures in the Future of the California Judiciary: 2020 Vision, 66 S. CAL. L. REv.
2121, 2160-65 (1993).
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favors incorporating ADR techniques more fully into the mainstream of
court operations.129 A separate ADR Office was established by the court
system in 1998 to coordinate and expand ADR.
In an effort to more effectively handle the workload of some very
high volume courts, the Kaye administration has been featuring combi-
nation programs in which emphasis is given to case management as but
one of several approaches. The objective is not only to achieve more
timely consideration and disposition of cases but in many instances to
resolve more satisfactorily the underlying problems that brought the par-
ties into court. Family Court, New York City Housing Court, and New
York City Criminal Court are the courts as to which the combined ap-
proach is currently being stressed.13O Case volume in each of these courts
exceeds 300,000 new cases annually.l3I Not only are the case volumes of
these courts immense, but the courts' proceedings are often complicated
by the high percentage of parties before them who are unrepresented by
counsel and with little or no prior knowledge of court procedures. An-
other significant aspect of these cases is that many, if not most, of the
parties are in court because of troublesome family relationships or pat-
terns of harmful behavior to themselves or others. These are usually on-
going problems that can often be helped by appropriate and continuing
judicial involvement, ifneeded help is available and forthcoming.
Although some aspects of the combined approach programs for
Family Court, New York City Housing Court, and New York City
Criminal Court were adopted prior to Judge Kaye becoming Chief
Judge,132 the programs have been more fully developed and featured
during her administration. The principal approaches of the programs are
improved case management, such as expedited case processing, and in
some situations team-based efforts by the judge and others working to-
gether to help parties attain more socially acceptable behavioral patterns
129. For Chief Judge Kaye's views on ADR, see JUDITH S. KAYE, THE STATE OF
THEJUDICIARY 14-15 (1993), and KAYE, supra note 100, at 13-14 (1995).
130. For detailed descriptions of the combined approach for the three courts, see
KAYE & LIPPMAN, supra notes 10, 11 & 94. On recent reforms in the three courts, see
JUDITH S. KAYE, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 7-25 (1999).
131. In 1998, new case filings for the three courts were: Family Court (statewide),
654,602; New York City Housing Court, 326,212; and New York City Criminal Court,
394,428 (arrest cases) and 488,651 cases (summons cases). See PROPOSED BUDGET, supra
note 10, at xiii-xvi.
132. See, e.g., SIMONS, supra note 115, at 19-40.
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and relationships.133 Other aspects are specialty parts or other special
subunits in each court to enable more efficient and expert determina-
tion,134 and providing counseling and other assistance to pro se litigants
so that they may represent themselves more effectively. The hope is that
by pushing multi-approach programs, not only will services provided by
the high volume courts involved improve, but dissatisfaction with these
courts will lessen, dissatisfaction now commonly experienced by parties
and lawyers who appear before them.
Very recently another combined approach program has been insti-
tuted by the court system, the Comprehensive Civil Justice Program.135
This is an effort to deal with the continuing problem of case delays and
backlogs in civil cases and to do so by simultaneously pushing a series of
different initiatives, all of them directed at faster and increasingly effi-
cient case disposition. The centerpiece of the program is more active
monitoring by the judge of each case before his or her court at every
stage in the proceedings. Differentiated case management will be im-
posed in which cases are screened at the outset for complexity and then
assigned to a particular track-typically an expedited, standard, or com-
plex track depending on likely discovery needs and court supervision
time required. Each track will have its own court-imposed time frame for
completing various stages in the litigation process. Judges will be as-
signed case coordinators to monitor and report on progress of cases and,
by computer-generated notices, to remind the lawyers involved as to pre-
scribed deadlines. Among other aspects of the program are expansion of
court-annexed ADR to additional districts in the state, replacing individ-
ual judges' civil case rules with uniform rules within each district, ex-
pansion of the commercial division to several more counties, and pro-
posals to the legislature for changes in the Civil Practice Law and Rules
(CPLR) that will further streamline the processing ofcivil cases.
E. Courthouse Facilities
Historically in New York, providing and maintaining courthouse fa-
cilities has been a local government obligation. Due to the failure of
many local governments to fulfill their obligation adequately, a 1987
133. On team-based efforts, see supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
134. On specialized court subunits, seesupra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
135. On this program, see JUDITH S. KAYE & JONATHAN LIPPMAN,
COMPREHENSIVE CIVIL JUSTICE PROGRAM (1999).
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state statute required city and county governments to submit to the Chief
Court Administrator, within two years, an assessment of the particular
locality's court facilities and a capital plan for their improvement.136 A
total of 119 cities and counties are subject to the requirement. Upon ap-
proval of the capital plan, state funding is available to help a locality im-
plement its plan. All 119 cities and towns have submitted plans and re-
ceived at least initial approval. Total estimated cost of these plans is $3.4
billion, over $2 billion of which is for improved court facilities in New
York City, all improvements scheduled to be completed by 2010. A total
of fifty-one cities and thirty-six counties have substantially completed
their capital plans, some consisting of new and expanded courthouses.
Progress in implementing New York City's plans has been slow, due in
part to the City's fiscal problems, but three new courthouses have re-
cently been built in New York City: two in Queens and one in the Bronx.
The New York City capital plan provides for thirty-two major projects.
In addition to some financial help to localities for major new and im-
proved courthouse facilities, the state also is gradually taking over from
local government courthouse cleaning and minor repair costs, except
those for town and village courts, and in a few years will be paying all of
these costS.137 The state also pays all capital maintenance and operations
costs for appellate division and Court ofAppeals courthouse facilities.
II. EXTERNAL CONTROLS AND PRESSURES
The New York State courts are subject to many external controls and
pressures that influence which reforms in court structure and administra-
tion are proposed and which are adopted. The court system has limited
legal authority to reform itself, more important reforms usually requiring
136. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 219 (McKinney 1998). The Chief Judge has provided
detailed Guidelines for New York State Court Facilities. See N.Y. RULES OF COURT,
RULES OF THE CHIEF JUDGE Pt. 34 (McKinney 1999). The Guidelines pertain mostly to
size and design ofcourt facilities for various usages. The ChiefJudge also has prescribed
Maintenance and Operations Standards for Court Facilities, with mandatory inspection
requirements. See id. at § 34.1.
On court facilities programs generally, progress made in program implementation
and program financing, see PROPOSED BUDGET, supra note 10, at xi; and 1998 ANNUAL
REpORT, supra note 27, at 29. The Court Facilities Incentive Aid Act, L. 1987, ch. 825,
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 540) provides state financial aid to cities and counties for judicial fa-
cilities.
137. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 39(b) (McKinney 1999), see also PROPOSED BUDGET
2000-2001, supra note 10, at xi.
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statutory or in some instances constitutional changes. Even when the
court system has the legal authority to reform its own structure or ad-
ministrative operations, it may be beholden to outside groups as to what
changes will be made and when. The outside groups may be govern-
mental, commonly state legislators, or they may be private, such as those
regularly before the courts as counselor parties, and that have a vested
interest in how the courts are structured and operated.
Under the constitutional concept of separation of powers, the courts
are a separate branch of government that share power with the other two
branches, the legislative and the executive. Some years ago Alexander
Bickel wrote a well known book about the courts in which he referred to
the courts as the "least dangerous branch.,,138 One could argue, although
it was not Bickel's message, that the courts are the least dangerous
branch because they are the least powerful. That the courts are the least
powerful branch is generally true ofthe New York courts, as it is of other
courts in this country. New York courts are dependent on the state legis-
lature for almost all their funding;139 salaries ofjudges are set by the leg-
islature;140 and the legislature determines, frequently in considerable de-
tail, many aspects of court organization and administration.141 The gov-
ernor, too, has some control over the courts, most particularly in budget-
ing142 and through pressures exerted on the legislature. The New York
courts are, of course, largely autonomous and independent in deciding
cases before them and through their own rules of court in prescribing
procedures for trial and appeal of cases and much of the detail of court
administration.
Any consideration of the power of the New York courts relative to
the other two branches of government, however, should also note efforts
by leadership of the court system to influence actions by the legislature
and the governor pertinent to the courts. Court leaders are not silent by-
standers. For example, the court system regularly makes proposals to the
138. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT ATTHEBAROFPOLmcs (2d ed. 1986).
139. See supra notes 10, 12, 29-31 and accompanying text. Town and village
courts, however, are an exception as they are largely funded by court fees, fines and local
government appropriations.
140. See supra note 67.
141. Most of these organizational and administrative controls are imposed by the
New York Judiciary Law, an extensive compilation ofstatutes concerning the courts.
142. See supra notes 35, 36 and accompanying text.
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legislature on legal changes affecting the courts, proposals ~proved in
advance by the chief judge or the chief court administrator.1 Many of
these legislative proposals are drafts of recommended legislation pre-
pared by the court system's Office of Counsel, and representatives of that
office are in frequent contact with legislators and the governor's counsel
on possible new legislation.l44 Stated more tersely, representatives of the
court system regularly lobby the legislature and the governor on court-
related matters. Other examples of efforts by representatives of the court
system to influence the legislature are speeches, published reports, and
press releases by recent chief judges intended in large part to generate
public support for legislative action favored by the court leadership. Still
another example, and one that is highly unusual and extreme, is Chief
Judge Wachtler's 1991 lawsuit against Governor Cuomo and legislative
leaders asserting that under the inherent powers doctrine the defendants'
conduct had been unconstitutional in not funding the courts adequately
and in the Governor's not incorporating the judiciary's budget request in
his recommended state financing for 1991. The inherent powers of the
court concept is part of the larger issue of judicial independence, about
which there continues to be much discussion at both the national and 10-
cal levels, but with little tangible impact.145 Judge Wachtler's suit was
dropped when the Governor and legislative leaders agreed to increases in
the budget for the judiciary substantially up to the previous year's appro-
priation.146 The lawsuit possibility, however remote, remains as an alter-
native if the court leadership again becomes highly dissatisfied with how
the legislature and the governor are treating the courts.
The other two branches of government are not the only sources of
external pressures on how the courts are organized and administered.
Groups from the private sector often exert such pressures as well. These
143. See, e.g., JUDITH S. KAYE & JONATHAN LIPPMAN, THE JUDICIARY'S 1998
LEGISLATIVE AGENDA (1998) (summarizing the 118 legislative proposals made by the
judiciary in 1998).
144. In the 1997 legislative session, for example, the court system's Office of
Counsel, with the assistance of advisory committees, prepared and submitted 116 new
measures for legislative consideration, 18 ofwhich were ultimately enacted into law. The
Office also furnished counsel to the governor with recommendations as to 43 measures
awaiting executive action. See 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 45-46.
145. For two excellent recent symposia on judicial independence, see Judicial In-
dependence and Accountability, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 1 (Summer 1998),; and Judi-
cial Independence and Accountability Symposium, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 311 (1999).
146. On the Wachtler v. Cuomo case, see supra note 28.
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groups may seek to influence the legislature and the governor's office on
judicial matters or they may seek to influence court leaders by such
means as advisory sessions with top court officials, studies of court op-
erations, reports on court needs or shortcomings, or press releases publi-
cizing their positions. The bar associations are important private pressure
groups of this sort. The larger bar associations in the state have commit-
tees concerned with various aspects of court operationsI47 and that often
report and make recommendations on court problems as the committees
perceive them. Also, committee and other representatives of bar associa-
tions in the state meet periodically with court leaders to discuss court
organizational and operational needs.I48 Some business groups whose
members are often litigants also on occasion, directly or through their
legal counsel, seek to influence court leadership to make changes in court
structure or operations favorable to the particular group's interests.I49
New York non profit public interest groups through studies, reports, and
discussions with court leaders are another external source of pressure on
the courts as to how the courts are organized and administered.I50 AI-
147. Among such committees are the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York's committees on Judicial Administration, Judicial Independence, Criminal Courts,
Family Court and Family Law, and Housing Court; the New York State Bar Associa-
tion's committees on Judicial Administration, Judicial Selection, Courts and the Commu-
nity, Procedure for Judicial Discipline, and to Improve Court Facilities; and the New
York State Trial Lawyers' Association's Committee on Legislative Affairs. The Associa-
tion of the Bar also has a Council on Judicial Administration that reports on important
issues pertaining to the courts. For an example of such a report, see Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Council on Judicial Administration, Report on the Chief
Judge's Restructuring Plan, 52 THE RECORD 930, 954 (1998).
148. E.g., meetings ofthe President and President-Elect ofthe New York State Bar
Association with the Chief Judge, Chief Court Administrator and other court officials on
a series of court-related issues, including actions in support of an independent judiciary,
functioning ofthe jury system, use ofalternative dispute resolution, and the Association's
recommended amendments to the Code of Professional Responsibility. On these meet-
ings, see Joshua M. Pruzansky, President's Message, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J., July-Aug. 1997,
at 3.
149. E.g., the influence of the Business Council of New York State and other
business groups in creation of the Commercial Division of the New York Supreme Court
in 1995. On this business influence, see HAIG, supra note 14, at 195.
150. One such group is the Fund for Modem Courts, a nonprofit civic organization
founded in 1955 to help improve the administration ofjustice in New York State by re-
search, public education and advocating reforms. Citizen monitoring of court perform-
ance is a major activity of the Fund and it has 600 volunteers in 16 counties across New
York State that act as monitors. For two recent reports of Fund monitors see supra note
24 (on five town and village courts); see also THE FuND FOR MODERN COURTS, THE
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though private sector interest groups often exert pressure on the courts to
achieve what the private groups want in the way of structural and ad-
ministrative court reforms, the courts also make use of these groups as
allies in contacts with the other two branches of government on court-
related reforms.151 In the arena of political influence, private interest
groups can be either friends or opponents ofthe court system.
III. RECENT REFORM PROPOSALS FOR NEW YORK STATE COURTS
Dissatisfaction with how New York State courts have been struc-
tured and operated has existed ever since the courts were first established
and there have been many proposals for reform.152 Some reform propos-
als have been adopted, many rejected. The push for reform has been par-
ticularly strong in the past few years, the most significant recent reform
effort being that proposed by ChiefJudge Kaye in 1997 and 1998.153
A. The Kaye Proposal
The Kaye proposal was supported by top administrators in the court
system, the governor, many legislators, important bar groups, and some
public interest organizations.154 The principal objective of the proposal
was to consolidate and simplify the trial court structure. It did not apply
to town and village courts but the nine state-funded trial courts in the
GoOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY OF THE NEW YORK CITY FAMILY COURT: A CITIZEN
COURT MONITORS' AsSESSMENT OF THE COURT AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
IMPROVEMENT (1997).
151. E.g., some of the committees function as allies of the court system on some
matters. See supra, note 27, at 46-52; see also note 88, and the accompanying text.
152. See BLOUSTEIN, supra note 9.
153. On the Kaye proposal, see these generally favorable comments: Association
of the Bar, supra note 147; Carey, supra note 44; CITIZEN UNION, COURT
REsTRUCTURING, APOSmONPAPER (March 1998); KAYE & LIPPMAN, supra note 143, at
1; and Gary S. Brown, Executive Director, Committee for Modem Courts, Statement at a
Joint Hearing ofthe Senate andAssembly Judiciary Comms. (Jan. 21, 1998).
In California, a state with even more severe growth pressures on its court system
than New York, there has recently also been a strong push for court reform. For some of
these proposals, see a symposium, 20120 Vision: A Plan for the Future of California's
Courts, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1751 (1993).
154. For a list of fifty organizations that had joined a coalition in support ofJudge
Kaye's court restructuring proposal, see CoMMITTEE FOR MODERN COURTS,
ORGANIZATIONS THAT SUPPORT COURT RESTRUCTURING (1998).
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state's so-called unified court system were, under the proposal, incorpo-
rated into one oftwo tiers: the supreme court, with unlimited jurisdiction;
and the district court, with limited jurisdiction. The upper tier, the su-
preme court, was to have specialized divisions: family, commercial,
public claims, probate, criminal, and any others ordered by the chief ad-
ministrative judge. The lower tier, the district court, was to have juris-
diction over minor criminal cases (misdemeanors), housing cases (e.g.,
evictions), and civil cases with claims up to $50,000. There was to be
one branch of the district court in New York City, with separate civil,
criminal and housing divisions. District court branches outside New
York City would have no divisions.
The Kaye proposal avoided the politically delicate issue of judicial
selection by adopting the status quo as to how different categories of
judges obtain their positions and their tenure terms. It did, however, in-
crease substantially the number of supreme court justices, generally more
prestigious and better paid trial judges, by incorporating into the supreme
court the present County Court, Family Court, Surrogate's Court, and
Court of Claims. It also would have largely eliminated the need for act-
ing supreme court justices by eliminating over time the principal reason
for such acting judges, the requirement that there cannot be more than
one supreme court justice for every 50,000 residents in a judicial dis-
trict. ISS
A very politically sensitive problem that the Kaye proposal did not
avoid is the high caseload burden of the appellate division court for the
Second Department, the appellate court serving much of the New York
City metropolitan area.IS6 The Second Department now handles a dispro-
portionately high number of cases compared to the other three Appellate
Division cOurtS. IS7 The Kaye proposal would create a new Fifth Depart-
ment, which would take over responsibility for cases from some of the
counties within the present Second Department. The proposal, however,
does not seek to resolve the contentious issue of what should be the geo-
155. On the statutory cap on the number of supreme court justices, see supra note
43 and accompanying text.
156. On the counties included in the Second Department, seesupra note 18.
157. E.g., in 1998 of 11,761 records on appeal filed in all appellate division courts,
4,456 were filed in the Second Department; of 19,227 cases disposed of by all appellate
division courts, 11,180 were disposed of by the Second Department; and of 5,616 cases
disposed of after argument or submission, 2,190 were disposed ofby the Second Depart-
ment. See 1998 ANNuAL REpORT, supra note 27, at 6.
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graphical boundaries of the new department-what present Second De-
partment counties would be included in a new Fifth Department.
Supporters of the Kaye proposal argued that the proposal would im-
prove the New York court system in a number ofways.15S It would create
a less confusing organizational structure, easier for litigants and the pub-
lic at large to understand. The consolidated structure would also enable
the court system to be administered more efficiently and with many cost
savings. In addition, it would largely eliminate fragmented proceedings,
especially troublesome in the family law field where different aspects of
the same underlying problem often are considered by different COurtS.159
Moreover, if the proposal were adopted, there would be little or no need
for acting supreme court justices, as these positions would be filled by
persons with full status and tenure as justices of the Supreme Court. Un-
der the proposal, too, the caseload burden of the Second Department
would be greatly alleviated by a new Fifth Department. Such, then,
would be the principal benefits that advocates of the Kaye proposal
claimed would result from adoption of the proposal. New York would
finally have a truly unified court system, a more rational system with
better service and ultimately at lower cost.
To achieve changes in the court system as fundamental as those in
the Kaye proposal would require amending the New York State Consti-
tution. The amendment procedure deemed most feasible by the pro-
posal's advocates was approval by majority vote of each house of the
legislature in two successive sessions, to be followed by majority ap-
proval of the people in a statewide vote.160 Despite the strong support the
proposal elicited, it never got past the first step in the amendment proc-
ess, the legislature. Merger bills were introduced in each house but due to
158. For comments supporting the proposal, see supra note 153. On the need for u
new Fifth Department, see Guy James Mangano, New Fifth Department Cn/cial,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 2000, at S1. Justice Mangano is presiding justice ofthe Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department.
159. Under the current system, child custody, support and visitation matters are
decided in family court but the supreme court has sole jurisdiction to grant divorces and
also may consider custody and support matters. On the adverse consequences of this di-
vided jurisdiction, see Association ofthe Bar, supra note 147, at 943-45.
On the need for a unified family court and a proposed model for such a court, see Barbara
A. Babb, Fashioning an Interdisciplinary Frameworkfor Court Refonn in Family Law: A
Blueprint to Constnlct a Unified Family Court, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 469 (1998).
160. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 1. Amendment by a constitutional convention is
an alternative possible amendment procedure. See N.Y. CONST. art. XIX § 2.
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failure to generate sufficient legislative support, and to sharp disagree-
ments between Assembly and Senate leaders, the bills were never voted
on.161
Why did the legislature reject the Kaye proposal? Apparently finan-
cial cost was a factor. At least in the near term, the proposal, if adopted,
conceivably would have substantially increased the cost to the state of
the judicial system, in part by added salary expense from more supreme
court justices, positions paid more than the judicial positions they would
replace.162 The Kaye proposal also had some very influential opponents.
Many supreme court justices opposed the proposal, seemingly because
their status would be reduced by adding to their number many judges
who formerly held less prestigious positions, such as acting supreme
court justices and family court and county court judges. Also opposed
were many trusts and estates lawyers, and presumably many surrogate's
court judges as well, because of the prospect that under the proposed
merger plan a number ofsurrogate's court judges and support staffmight
be assigned to other courts, thereby reducing available expertise needed
to best handle trusts and estates matters.163 Among other opponents was
the 2,200-member New York State Clerks' Association, seemingly be-
cause of concern that the proposed changes might result in pay cuts for
some court clerks. Failure of an attempted trade-off by some liberal leg-
islators of support for court structure reform in return for substantial new
state funding of legal services for the poor also contributed to defeat of
the Kaye proposa1.164
161. Senate Bi1l4226, (introduced by the Chair of the Senate Judicial Committee
followed closely Judge Kaye's proposals). S. 4226; 222 Leg. (N.Y. 1999)
A major reform effort in the late 1980s also failed. This effort, strongly backed by the
state's top court administrators, proposed abolishing as separate courts the court of
claims, county court, fumily court, surrogate's court, district courts and the New York
City Civil and Criminal Courts. The 1986 legislature gave first passage to a constitutional
amendment that would authorize a merger proposed for the above listed courts, but the
measure failed to achieve the required second approval.
162. A court system study asserts that the Kaye proposal restructuring would,
through increased productivity and efficiency, result in net savings to the state and by
over $38 million dollars a year by the fifth year following implementation. See NY
UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, TRIAL COURT REsTRUCTURING IN NYS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
BUOGETARYOOACT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (March 1998).
163. See Association of the Bar, supra note 147, at 963, Dissent of the Committee
on Trusts, Estates and Surrogate's Courts.
164. An unsuccessful Assembly bill introduced late in the 1997-98 legislative ses-
sion sought to implement a trade-offby including a very limited version ofcourt structure
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What chance does the Kaye proposal have in future legislatures?
Predicting the outcome of controversial political issues in New York is
always a chancy undertaking, but as of the present time, prospects for
adoption of the Kay proposal in the next few years do not appear favor-
able, although the court system remains committed to the proposal.165 It
is likely to be too difficult to soon again generate even the backing the
proposal had in 1997-98, backing that proved to be insufficient.166
B. Selection ofJudges
In addition to court consolidation proposals made by Judge Kaye,
there have been a number of other significant proposals advanced in re-
cent years for reform of the structure or operation of New York State
courts. Among the most persistently controversial of these reform pro-
posals is judicial selection: whether judges should be appointed or popu-
larly elected; if appointed, by whom; and the duration ofjudicial terms.
There are many options.167 The present pattern of some judges being
elected and some appointed seems to fully satisfy no one. Political lead-
ers of the dominant political party commonly favor election, especially if
they determine nominees, as is often the case. Governors and mayors
may favor appointment, especially if they control the appointment proc-
ess. Good government organizations usually favor some form of merit
selection of judges. One such New York organization, The Committee
reform with a new $40 million fund for legal services. See Gary Spencer, Assembly Files
Merger Bill at 11th Hour, N.Y.LJ., June 15, 1998, at 1; Gary Spencer, COllrt Reorgani-
zation BillDies in Legislature, N.Y.L.J., June 23, 1998, at 1.
It has also been claimed that the basic deal breaker in major structural reform of the New
York courts is inability of the state Republicans and Democmts and their leaders to reach
a compromise agreement on how many authorized judges there should be in districts
controlled by Republicans and how many in districts controlled by Democmts. The result
is reform plan death by partisanship. See David Rohde, A Familiar Obstacle, Partisan
Rancor Threatens Effort to Overhaul New York Courts, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16,2000, at 31.
165. See JUDITH S. KAYE, THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 8 (2000).
166. Some indication that interest in structural reform of the New York courts
peaked in 1997-98 is that court restructuring bills introduced in the 1998-99 session of
the New York legislature created little publicity or interest and likewise failed ofpassage.
One of the 1998-99 bills, Senate Bill 4191, included much of the earlier Kaye proposal,
although it did retain the surrogate's court as a separate court not merged into the su-
preme court. See S. 4191; 222 Leg. (N.Y. 1999).
167. On the various methods used in the United States to select state court judges,
see ROBERTA. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN AMERICA 256-62 (1996).
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for Modem Courts, recommends that the New York Constitution be
amended to provide for a three-step merit selection process for judges as
follows:
In step one, a broadly based nonpartisan nominating commission
proposes a short list of candidates for appointment to a judicial vacancy.
In step two, an elected chief executive chooses from the short list of pro-
posed names. In step three, the voters ratify or disapprove the appoint-
ment by participating in a retention election after a judge has served on
the bench long enough to assess actual performance.168
Another good government organization, the Citizens Union, favors
an appointment system modeled after that now followed in selecting
New York Court of Appeals judges.169 Under this system, a commission
appointed by a wide range of executive, legislative and judicial public
officials nominates a small number of candidates for each vacancy from
which the appointing authority must choose. However, recognizing po-
litical reality and that some judges will continue to be elected, the Citi-
zens Union recommends that primaries rather than political party judicial
conventions should nominate judges as election candidates and also that
reliable and trustworthy screening committees report to the public as to
whether candidates up for election are qualified.170 The Council on Judi-
cial Administration of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York also favors a judicial selection system similar to that for Court of
Appeals judges and recommends that it be put in place for all judges, not
just those currently appointed.l7l In addition, the Council opposes any
168. See COMMISSION FOR MODERN COURTS, CITIZENS' BILL OF RIGHTS FOR THE
COURT SYSTEM 4 (1998).
169. For the Citizens Union recommendation, see supra note 153, at 3-4. The se-
lection system for Court of Appeals judges is mandated by the constitution. See N.Y.
CONST. art. VI, § 2(c)-(g). The governor makes appointments from those recommended
by a judicial nominating commission, with the advice and consent of the State Senate.
N.Y. CaNST., art. VI, § 2(e). On the judicial nominating commission, also see N.Y. JuD.
LAw art. 3A
170. See CITIZENS UNION, supra note 153, at 4-5.
171. See Association ofthe Bar, supra note 147, at 954.
The court system leadership, just before Judith Kaye became Chief Judge, proposed
nonpartisan selection ofjudges similar to that of the Court ofAppeals. See SIMONS, supra
note 115, at 51, which states the following:
Our State has an excellent record of producing outstanding judges.
Despite this record, the process by which we select many of our
judges is far from ideal. Political party leaders who dominate the par-
tisan election process sometimes grant or withhold party endorsement
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judges being appointed by the chief administrative judge or any other
judge.172
The question ofwhat is the best possible judicial selection system for
any particular state or locality is a very difficult one, especially if it is
recognized that left to the electorate, few voters, except perhaps for local
judicial candidates in small towns or rural communities, will have any
familiarity with any of the judicial candidates, even name recognition.
Merit selection is an appealing option and in general terms its attractions
have been well stated by the Committee for Modem Courts:
A merit plan eliminates the most blatantly political aspects
of the elective process, in which judicial candidates are essen-
tially hand-picked by political party leaders. Merit selection also
eliminates the conflicts of interest and appearances of impropri-
ety that are created when judicial candidates are forced to cam-
paign for office and raise money from lawyers whose cases they
may ultimately decide. Furthermore, the evidence is strong that
merit selection results in a more diverse judiciary than the elec-
for reasons that have no bearing on fitness for judicial office. This
threatens the independence of the Judiciary, contributes to a public
misperception of its function, and diminishes public faith in the qual-
ity ofits judgments.
We continue to believe that the appointment ofjudges after nomina-
tion by a nonpartisan commission on judicial nomination, as now ap-
plies to the Court ofAppeals, is a better system. It would take the se-
lection of judges out of the partisan political arena. We recognize,
however, that many members of the Legislature prefer to maintain an
elective system ofchoosing some trial judges. Consequently, we pro-
pose that even if the elective system is retained, an element of non-
partisan selection be added to it. In an elective system, we believe
that nonpartisan screening panels in each judicial district should re-
view the qualifications of all prospective candidates. No candidate
would be eligible for election unless he or she was found well quali-
fied for judicial office. This proposal"meets both the desire that the
elective system be retained and the concern that only well qualified
judicial candidates be elected.
172. See Association of the Bar, supra note 147, at 954. New York City Housing
Court judges, nominally being referees, currently are appointed by the chief court ad-
ministrator from candidates submitted by an advisory council. See N.Y. JUD. LAW, N.Y.
CITY CIVIL COURT ACT § 110 (f) (McKinney Supp. 1999).
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A universal feature of merit selection is the judicial nominating
commission, and the usual functions of such a commission are selecting,
evaluating and recommending candidates for judicial vacancies.174 There
are many variations among merit systems on such matters as who selects
commission members; the required size and makeup of the commission;
to whom the commission makes its recommendations (e.g., governor or
legislature); and once selected, whether judges must later face retention
election by the general electorate to remain in office. Many questions
obviously remain as to the merits of merit selection. For example, are
commissions that are purportedly nonpartisan really free from unaccept-
able political interference and bias; if a commission clearly is politically
neutral and nonpartisan, do its selections reflect an elitist bias in what is a
good judge; and does the merit selection process result in too few minor-
ity judges?175
173. COMMISSION FOR MODERN COURTS, supra note 168, at 4.
174. On merit selection of judges, see lARRy C. BERKSON, Selection of State
Judges: Election or Appointment?, in MANAGING THE STATE COURTS 134 (Larry C. Berk-
son et al. eds., 1977); ANTHONY CHAMPAGNE & JUDITH HAYDEL, Conclusion, in JUDICIAL
REFORM IN THE STATES ch. 9 (Anthony Champagne et al. eds., 1993); and Jay A
Daugherty, The Missouri Non-Partisan Plan: A Dinosaur on the Edge ofExtinction or a
Survivor in a Changing Socio-Legal Environment, 62 Mo. L. REv. 315 (1997).
The ABA Standards favor merit selection and provide that judges should be selected
by a nominating commission that recommends to the governor at least three qualified
candidates for each judicial vacancy, the governor to select one of the three. The pro-
posed commission consists of one nonvoting judge, as chairman, plus three lawyers
elected by the bar and four public nonlawyer members selected by the governor. See
ABA, 1 STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION § 1.21 (1990). On merit selection
limitations and judicial evaluation commission reports as means of improving the process
ofjudicial retention, see Kevin M. Esterling, Judicial Accountablility the Right Way, 82
JUDICATURE 206 (1999). For judicial evaluation on Connecticut, see William F. Galla-
gher, Judging Judges: Connecticut's Judicial Performance Evaluation Program, 10 CT.
LAW. 4 (Nov. 1999).
However, election of judges is supported by some who are in a good position to
evaluate the caliber ofjudges selected under the election system. For example, a former
Chief Justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, after recounting the disadvantages of the
election system, favors its retention in his state. See Nathan S. Heffernan, Judicial Re-
sponsibility, Judicial Independence and the Election ofJudges, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 1031
(1997).
175. Champagne and Haydel, from studies ofjudicial selection, have come to this
conclusion: "[D]espite the rhetoric of the reformers, there is no ideal selection system
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New York is unlikely to move any time soon to a merit system in
which the evils noted by the Committee for Modern Courts are largely
eliminated. This is due partly to the patronage benefits that the major
political parties and many of their leaders see in the present system. But
it is also due in part to the difficulty of developing the ideal selection
system and one that even the various good government groups can agree
on as providing the best possible judiciary.
C. Expansion ofReforms
Although recent proposals for major reform in New York court
structure and judicial selection have not been adopted, some important
reforms recently have been made. However, in many instances these re-
forms have been applied in only a few counties and this has posed further
reform problems: where and when to expand imposition of the reforms.
Expansion concerns are particularly evident as to the programs aimed at
upgrading services provided by some of the very high volume courts. As
earlier noted, these programs have sought to provide better service by
such means as adding specialty parts, providing counselors and other
aids to litigants not represented by counsel, and by expanding the judicial
role from merely adjudicating controversies to involvement in efforts
fundamentally to change antisocial behavior patterns ofparties before the
COurtS.176 The decision as to where and when to expand these improved
service programs, or even whether to expand them at all, can turn on
such considerations as available funding, whether volume in the other
counties justifies expansion, and whether the programs have been suffi-
ciently tested to show that they merit expansion.
Expanding the number of judges, especially for courts with ex-
tremely high caseloads per judge, is another reform proposal. One effort
in this direction is the judiciary's current request of the legislature that
twenty-three more judges be added to the New York City Criminal
Court, a court in which last year each judge, on average, handled nearly
5,000 cases.177 The judiciary is also asking for added funding from the
legislature to improve access to justice for more poor persons by in-
creasing assigned counsel fees paid by the state, thereby increasing the
(although admittedly there are ways to modify selection systems to reduce some prob-
lems that have occurred)." CHAMPAGNE & HAYDEL, supra note 174, at 15.
176. See supra notes 130-135 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
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number of attorneys available to represent poor persons in need of legal
services, but unable to pay for them.
Another highly important reform proposal that has recently been ex-
tensively adopted and implemented is more and better courthouse facili-
ties: buildings and equipment, including advanced technology for proc-
essing and exchange of information.178 Here, too, there are problems of
where and when to expand. Extensive agreement exists on expansion
plans, but available funding to enable plans to be carried out on time is
questionable.
IV. OTHER REFORM POSSffiILITIES
Much the same concerns as to how the New York State court system
should best be structured and operated also exist as to other court sys-
tems in the United States. In response to these concerns, pressure for
court reform is occurring everywhere in the United States and a wide
range of reform proposals currently are being put forward. Many of these
proposals have no serious current support in New York, however prom-
ising they may be. Reasons for this vary. They may, for example, pres-
ently be politically unacceptable, too expensive, or too extreme a depar-
ture from current norms.
This section considers some of these recent reform proposals that
have promise but lack much if any present backing in New York Some
of them have been adopted in one or more other jurisdictions; some are
revivals of old ideas; some are directed at courts generally, some at
courts of only one jurisdiction although adaptable elsewhere. Only a
limited sampling of reform proposals is included in this section. Com-
prehensive coverage would unduly shift the intended focus of the article.
However, the limited sampling provided does illustrate what a wide
range of possibilities New York may be forced seriously to consider in
the future and also, from some of the examples considered, what radical
changes in court structure and operations may eventually be necessary if
the New York court system is to meet satisfactorily the demands made
on it.
178. See supra notes 136-137 and accompanying text.
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A. Trial Court Structural Unification
[Vol. 43
Court unification has been one of the major themes in state court re-
form efforts over the past century, with Roscoe Pound generating much
of the early interest in the subject.179 Court unification proponents favor a
simplified and consolidated court structure.ISO One version, of course, is
the 1997-98 Kaye proposal for New York that includes a two-tiered state
trial court structure but largely excludes local town and village courts
from the consolidated structure. An alternative version is the one pro-
posed by the influential American Bar Association's Judicial Admini-
stration Division and that has been widely considered and adopted in
major respects by some states.181 The ABA version, as set forth in a de-
tailed set of ABA Standards, provides for a one-tiered trial court, with,
where appropriate, "specialized procedures and divisions to accommo-
date the various Wes of criminal, civil, and family matters within its
jurisdiction ....,,1 Another important feature of the ABA one-tier trial
179. On the history of court unification, see generally lARRY C. BERKSON &
SUSAN J. CARBON, COURT UNIFICATION: HISTORY, POLmcs, AND INTERPRETATION ch. 1
(1978).
Roscoe Pound, one-time dean of the Harvard Law School, summarized his views on
court unification in a book, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS ch. 8 (1940) and discussed his
presentation to the American Bar Association in 1906 on "The Causes ofPopular Dissat-
isfaction with the Administration ofJustice." This presentation, many believe, stirred the
ABA into starting what became a long-term study and action program on court structure
and administration. In his 1906 paper presented to the ABA, Pound argues "that our sys-
tem ofcourts is archaic in three respects: (1) in its multiplicity ofcourts, (2) in preserving
concurrent jurisdictions, (3) in the waste ofjudicial power which it involves," Id. at 273.
180. Court unification proposals also often include centralized and consolidated
court administration, centralized court budgeting and state funding of all non-federal
courts in each state. For various aspects of court unification, see JAMES A. GAZELL, The
Current Status ofState Court Refonn: A National Perspective, in HAyS & GRAHAM, Sll-
pra note 76, at 79; Steven W. Hays, Contemporary Trends in Court Unification, in
BERKSON, supra note 174, at 122; and Lawson, supra note 84. Concern with more than
structural unification also is apparent in ABA, 1 STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
AoM~STRATION(1990).
181. Among state one-tier trial court systems are these: Connecticut (except for
probate court), CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-98, 51-164(s) (West 1985); ILL. CONST. arts. VI
& IX; Mo. CONST. art. 5. See also Victor E. Flango & David B. Rottman, Research Note:
Measuring Trial Court Consolidation, 16 JUST. SYs. J. 1, at 65 (1992) (classifying state
courts by degree oftrial court consolidation).
182. ABA, 1 STANDARDSOFJUDICIALAoM~STRATION § 1.10.
The ABA Standards of Judicial Administration appear in three volumes: vol. 1,
Standards Relating to Court Organization; vol. 2, Standards Relating to Trial Courts
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court proposal is that the court should have jurisdiction over all cases and
proceedings brought in the state, other than appeals, administrative
agency cases and cases filed in federal COurt.I83 This means no separate
small claims or minor criminal or traffic infraction court systems, in-
cluding local court systems maintained by local government.I84
Arguments for a one-tier trial court are that it is more likely to pro-
vide equal and uniform justice throughout the state, reduce forum shop-
ping, increase desirable flexibility in assigning judges and other court
personnel when shifts in workloads occur, and reduce the sense of infe-
rior justice and inferior judicial status that tend to result from a system of
lower courts with minor civil or criminal jurisdiction.I8s Arguments
against the one-tier trial court include the likelihood that the number of
highly qualified prospects for the bench will be reduced by the possibil-
ity of lengthy judicial assignments to a division or part hearing only mi-
nor criminal, small claims or traffic matters. Also, if courts established
and maintained by local government are abolished through their incorpo-
ration into the unified state system, many local perceptions of what con-
stitutes justice, including local confidence in who is meting out justice,
will be weakened. Just as there are variations among states in what is
considered a fair and proper result in adjudicated matters and who can be
trusted as a justice system decision maker, so there are similar variations
among localities. Incorporating local courts into the state system elimi-
nates, at least on some matters, locality choices in obtaining the kind of
justice and justice system each locality prefers.
B. Case Backlogs and Delays
Unacceptably high case backlogs, and the related undue delays in
case dispositions, are common problems in most all American court sys-
(1992); and vol. 3, Standards Relating to Appellate Courts (1994). The ABA Standards
approved in the 1990s are amended versions ofthose earlier approved in the 1970s. For a
review and an analysis of the Standards, see CoLE B. GRAHAM, JR., The American Bar
Association's Standards Relating to Court Organization: A General Review, in HAyS &
GRAHAM, supra note 76, at 101.
183. See ABA, 1 STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL AoMINISTRATlON § 1.12(a).
184. The standards do, however, suggest that judicial officers who are not judges
could try minor civil and criminal matters. See id. at commentary to § 112(b). This possi-
bility can reduce an unattractive feature ofjudicial service to many judges and prospec-
tive judges, i.e., the chance ofbeing assigned to courts hearing only very minor matters.
185. See id. at commentary to § 1.11.
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tems. The principal underlying cause of these problems is high case vol-
ume, more cases than existing court resources can process before too
many cases take too long to finally resolve. One possible approach to
case backlog and delay problems, going beyond what has been seriously
considered for New York, is a greatly expanded diversion of cases to
decision making bodies other than the courts. A quite radical proposal for
doing this is to encourage private dispute resolution services to take over
much of the public court caseload.ls Private dispute resolution, this ap-
proach assumes, would be more efficient than government in providing
legal services. The market should control legal service allocation, and
litigants should have the opportunity to choose from a variety of dispute
resolution providers and modes of dispute resolution at different prices.
An expanded version of "rent-a-judge" is one model for this approach in
civil matters.IS7 Government contracting with a private court system to
take over criminal court services is another.ISS Still another is expansion
of mandatory ADR to some types of cases that take extensive court time
to try. For example, one proposal is that all business litigation involving
claims of over $100,000, if a case is likely to require three or more days
to try, must be scheduled for ADR.IS9 Proponents of this requirement
also suggest that to further reduce court caseloads, perhaps mandatory
ADR should be extended to automobile accident liability cases, a high
volume ofproceedings now flooding the civil court system.190
Although mandatory case diversion schemes can substantially reduce
court caseloads and caseload burdens, it should be recognized that this
comes at a cost. A consequence of diversion is that the right of court ac-
cess, often a cherished right in our democratic order, is lost. Diversionary
substitutes also may lack the trusted procedures and respected neutral
adjudicators that the government court system provides. Moreover, as to
at least one kind of diversion, the shift of cases from government courts
to government administrative agencies, caseloads are not reduced but
merely transferred within the government. The caseload burden to the
186. On private dispute resolution services, see BRUCE L. BENSON, THE
ENTERPRISE OF LAW: JUSTICE WITHOUT TIlE STATE (1990); and Solum, supra note 128, at
2139-46.
187. See Solum, supra note 128,2139-40; Kris10v & Kramer, supra note 122, at
1943-44.
188. See Solum, supra note 128, at 2144.
189. See Kris10v & Kramer, supra note 122, at 1941-42.
190. See id. at 1941.
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government remains.
One reason for high caseloads and unacceptable delay in case dispo-
sitions is too few judges to handle the caseload. This shortage of judges
is primarily due to lack of sufficient funding; but it is recognized in all
American jurisdictions that adequate funding will never be forthcoming
to provide an optimal number of judges. A few court systems have
sought to ease the judicial shortage problem, and thereby ease somewhat
case backlogs and delay, by taking on volunteer lawyers to fill some
part-time judicial or judicial support positions.19l Prospects for this ap-
proach seem particularly promising given the growing number of retired
lawyers, many of whom would be both willing and able to take on vol-
unteer judicial-type duties.
c. Juries and Jury Trials
This is another subject that recently has attracted considerable atten-
tion from court reformers, and with this subject, too, some of the propos-
als recommend drastic departures from existing American court prac-
tices.192 One proposal that is supported by some students of the jury sys-
tem is to sharply limit the right to jury trial in civil cases. A frequently
referred to article supporting this proposal takes the position that the civil
jury should be restricted to cases involving complex societal values or
overt political content, including those cases in which the government is
191. E.g., for experience with volunteers in Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma
at the appellate court level, see Thomas V. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody,Research Note:
Volunteer Attorneys as Appellate Judges, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 1,49 (1992). For a parajudicial
officer program in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, see J. Read
Murphy, The Parajudicial Program in the Connecticut Federal Courts, 25 CORNELL L.
F., Mar. 1999, at 9. In the Connecticut program, volunteer retired lawyers are used part-
time to conduct pretrial conferences aimed at encouraging settlements; and when settle-
ments do not result, then to reduce discovery, narrow the issues to be litigated and set
dates for upcoming motions and orders. See id.
The New York court system in a few situations makes use ofvolunteer lawyers, e.g.,
as mediators in some ADR programs. See descriptions of particular ADR programs in
STATE ADR OFFICE, supra note 123.
192. For a review of arguments for and against reforms of the civil jury, see Peter
H. Schuck, Mapping the Debate on Jury Reform, in VERDICT: AsSESSING THE CIVIL JURY
SYSTEM 306 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). Schuck is of the opinion that the alleged vices
and supposed virtues of juries are exaggerated and that critics of the jury system "have
not yet substantiated their most salient claims; still less have they made a compelling case
for abolishing the jury." Id. at 330-31.
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a party; no jury trial should be permitted in routine types of cases.193 The
principal argument advanced in support of this position is that it would
greatly reduce trial court congestion, not only because jury trials take
longer than trials without a jury, but also because more routine cases
would be settled ifjury trial were not available.194 The unpredictability of
how juries will decide is what results in many routine cases, including
many personal injury accident cases, not being settled. Litigants in some
routine cases are willing to chance an unRredictable jury verdict, whereas
without that option they prefer to settle.! 5 Where there is no clear social
purpose for them, juries should be prohibited.
Other commentators have concluded that juries should not be per-
mitted in any complex civil litigation because in those cases juries are
often incompetent, unable sufficiently to comprehend the evidence or the
judge's instructions to be acceptable participants in the trial process.196 A
response to this by some is special juries in complex civil litigation, ju-
ries in which the jurors are chosen because of superior educational back-
grounds or special experience.197 There is a long history of special juries
in Anglo-American jurisdictions;198 but in the United States the concept
has been abandoned, except in Delaware, where it is still available upon
193. See George L. Priest, The Role ofthe Civil Jury in a System ofPrivate Litiga-
tion, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 198-99. For a shortened version of this article, see
George L. Priest, Justifying the Civil Jury, in Litan, supra note 192, at 103.
194. Priest, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F., supra note 193, at 199-200.
195. Id. at 200.
196. See, e.g., Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury: A Proposal for Complex Liti-
gation, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 49, 51-56 (1997). But cf. Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and
Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in Litan, supra note 192, at 181, in
which Lempert concludes: "[T]he weight of the evidence indicates that juries can reach
rationally defensible verdicts in complex cases, [and] that we cannot assume that judges
in complex cases will perform better than juries ...." Id. at 235.
An earlier very negative critic of juries generally was Jerome Frank, an eminent
scholar and judge, whose views on juries are often referred to by others in evaluating the
jury system. For Frank's views, see JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 170-85
(1936).
197. For arguments in support of special juries, see Dan Drazan, The Case for
Special Juries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 72 JUDICATURE 292 (1989); Rita Sutton, A More
Rational Approach to Complex Civil Litigation in the Federal Courts: The Special Jury,
1990 U. CHI. LEGALF. 575; and Strier, supra note 196. Drazan recommends that special
juries made up of scientific and medical experts be used in toxic tort cases. Strier pro-
poses that half the members of every jury in complex cases be college graduates. See
Strier, supra note 196, at 78-79.
198. On the history ofspecial juries see Sutton, supra note 197, at 579-80.
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application by any party in complex civillitigation.199 There is some
question as to the constitutionality of special juries under the Seventh
Amendment/oo and they also are vulnerable on racial and class discrimi-
nation grounds, as persons of lesser education would commonly be dis-
qualified and these are disproportionately minorities and persons of
lower income.201
Another proposed jury reform that departs markedly from current
practice is the abbreviated jury trial, a novel approach aimed at modify-
ing the jury system so as to shorten trial time and relieve court
caseloads.202 Under the abbreviated jury trial proposal, early in the pre-
trial stage of a jury case, the judge would set a time limit for each side's
cQurtroom presentation, the time to be relatively short compared to con-
ventional jury trials, and each side would be required to complete its trial
presentation in the prescribed time?03 Pretrial and trial procedures, in-
cluding discovery rules, would be revised to further facilitate accelera-
tion of the trial process?04 The abbreviated jury trial concept is another
example of the kind of fundamental change that must be considered if
state court systems are to satisfactorily accommodate continuing in-
creased demands on their resources. Proposals should not be summarily
rejected merely because, if adopted, they would drastically alter current
institutions or practices.
D. Supplemental Funding
As the cost to state government of funding the judicial system goes
up, prospects for major funding from other sources becomes more likely.
Two promising supplemental funding sources are sharp increases in state
199. The Delaware statute authorizing special juries provides: "The Court may or-
der a special jury upon the application of any party in a complex civil case. The party
applying for a special jury shall pay the expense incurred by having a special jury, which
may be allowed as part of the costs of the case." DEL. CODE ANN. § 4506 (Michie, 1998
Supp.).
200. See Sutton, supra note 197, at 582-85.
201. See id. at 587-95 on fair cross-section and due process requirements as they
apply to special juries.
202. On the abbreviated jury trial proposal, see Michael L. Siegel, Pragmatism
Applied: Imaging a Solution to the Problem ofCourt Congestion, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv.
567,593-621 (1994).
203. See id. at 601.
204. See id. at 602-14.
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court charges on those using the system-fees, fmes and penalties, and
major increases in federal grants for state court operations.
State governments, unlike many local governments, have generally
relied on filing fees and other user charges for only a small percentage of
what it costs to operate their court systems. Even if fines and other pen-
alties are included, few state courts generate sufficient income to pay for
the cost of operating the state court system?05 There is some possibility
that this will change and more state court systems, or units within state
court systems, will be financially self-sustaining or nearly so.
This is a reform with some appea1?06 In a market-oriented economy,
consumers arguably should pay for the services they receive; and liti-
gants are consumers of an important service, adjudication. In some busi-
nesses, litigation costs, including lawyers' fees, are even considered an-
ticipated costs of doing business. Should not these costs include what it
costs government to provide businesses with that essential to litigation,
205. A state by state study of court expenditures and revenues as of 1990 shows
that court charges (fees, fines and penalties) by state and local courts combined were the
following percentages of state and local appropriations for the courts in these States:
California, 79%; Connecticut, 44%; Massachusetts, 14%; and New Jersey, 12%. Data for
New York was incomplete. See David Bresnick, Revenue Generation by the Courts, in
HAyS & GRAHAM, supra note 76, at 358-59. In two states, South Carolina and South
Dakota, the courts collected more in revenue than it cost to operate them. See id.
206. For arguments generally favorable to increased reliance on court-generated
revenues to fund court operations, see id. at 355-65. Bresnick concludes, however, that
guidelines are needed to minimize risks of abuse from court-generated revenues and
among his proposed guidelines are these:
Those who use the courts should pay for them where feasible. In the
case of indigents, the costs should be paid by the general public
through an allocation from the state legislature....
If a party is found to have been at fault (e.g., committed a criminal
offense, violated a contract, committed a tort), that party should pay
the costs ofthe court activity.
If a case is resolved by negotiation, the agreement should specify
who should pay the courts costs....
Fees, fines, and penalties should be tailored to the particular type of
case involved. The following categories merit separate and distinct
consideration: felonies, misdemeanors, infractions, traffic violations,
probate, personal injury, commercial litigation, administrative re-
view, and divorce.
ld. at 364-65.
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court services? When government operates a mass transit system, a toll
road, or a water distribution system, consumers pay all or most of the
cost. Why should they not pay equally for the court system when they
use it? Pushing the cost-assumption concept still further, should not each
defendant found guilty in a criminal proceeding be charged a fee, in ad-
dition to any possible fine, based on the estimated full cost to the gov-
ernment ofproviding court services in the case?
There is, of course, strong opposition to requiring that parties using
the courts pay all or most of the government's cost of providing court
services. The most compelling reason is that much enhanced user
charges would deter access to the courts, and ready access is necessary if
courts are to fully ~erform their conflict resolution function so essential
to a stable society? 7 Another reason is that permitting sharp increases in
court user charges is subject to abuse in those states where judges deter-
mine court budgets, including their own compensation, and also deter-
mine what court charges parties must pay?08 The risk is too great that
judges would unduly increase charges to benefit themselves, or would be
perceived as so motivated.
The federal government is another potential source of substantially
increased supplemental funding of state court systems. Some federal
grants for state court operations now exist, relatively minor in amount,
except for those directed to drug courts, drug cases generally, or some
court programs concerning children?09 If state court systems become
sufficiently hard-pressed financially, and especially if court access or
case-consideration time is being very seriously compromised, much in-
creased federal aid might be forthcoming. Prospects for much greater
federal financial aid to state courts presumably would be enhanced if cur-
rent efforts to end federal court diversity jurisdiction are successful, a
207. Note that if a court system is to be fully self-sustaining financially, user
charges must be sufficiently high to make up for the many parties, such as many criminal
defendants, who are unable to pay the charges.
208. See, e.g., ABA, 1 STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, commentary to
§ 1.53; Jonathan P. Nase, The Revenue Agent Role ofState Courts: Implications for Ad-
ministration and Adjudication, 76 JUDICATURE 195, 199-200 (1993).
209. On federal funding available to state courts, see Robert W. Tobin, Funding
the State Courts: Issues and Approaches, 42-46 & app. 4 (1996), a publication of the
National Center for State Courts.
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move that would materially increase state court caseloads;lO
V. CONCLUSIONS
Given its large number ofjudges, sizable nonjudicial staff and mas-
sive case volume, the court system in New York is remarkably well run
and effective. Its judges, with the assistance of a generally quite able
support staff, capably consider and dispose of the tremendous flow of
cases that the system must deal with. Specialized courts and subunits of
courts facilitate case disposition, as do case management procedures de-
signed to move cases efficiently through to completion. The court system
also is well administered. Top leadership is particularly outstanding. It is
highly competent in fulfilling its oversight duties, aware of reform needs
and reform prospects, and astute in representing the court system's inter-
ests in relations with other government agencies, private groups and the
general public.
Despite its performance record, the New York State court system is
faced with some very serious and difficult problems. How effective the
courts will be in the future depends to a considerable extent on how satis-
factorily these problems are dealt with. Funding is an obvious and con-
tinuing problem and intensifies for a time each year when budget nego-
tiations take place on the court system's share of the next year's planned
state expenditures. Especially in seeking substantial increases in budget
allocations over that of earlier years, the court system tends to have
lower priority with the legislature and the governor than do such com-
peting claims as education, health care, child care, highways, and in
prosperous years, tax cuts. Moreover, recession years may result in
strong moves to cut the state budget across the board irrespective of
need. What seems likely in the foreseeable future is that the court system
will receive its present proportionate share of the state's budget expen-
ditures, with at best only minor increases.2l1 The legislature may respond
favorably to some proposed new judicial programs that are not too ex-
210. On limiting or abolishing diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts and the
implications of doing so, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 210-21 & 290-
92 (1996).
211. The 1999-2000 state court operation increase of5.4% compared to a 2.4% in-
crease in general fund spending for all state agencies is as favorable a budget allocation
increase as the courts are likely to receive for some time. For a review of the 1999-2000
state budget as it applies to the courts, see Gary Spencer, Budget is Very Good to the
Courts, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 5, 1999, at 1.
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pensive and its budget allocations may reflect general inflationary trends,
but massive increase in the court system's budget in anyone year is very
unlikely.
Inevitable budget limitations pose the difficult problem of what and
where to cut if costly new programs are being instituted or current pro-
grams expanded and new funding is not available to pay for them. One
solution is to increase the caseloads of individual judges in at least some
courts, which means a cut in the time and attention that many types of
cases will receive. Another solution is cutting court caseloads by such
diversionary means as mandatory ADR or reducing the number of initial
case filings by substantially increasing court fees. Still another solution is
sharply limiting the availability of jury trials, thereby saving court time
and some financial costs to the court system. This problem of what and
where to cut is one ofthe hardest problems faced by court administrators,
who commonly must make these decisions. Individual judges also must
face the problem when their caseload demands increase, as they have
considerable discretion in determining what matters before them receive
how much of their time and attention. The problem ofwhat and where to
cut promises to be especially acute in New York in the immediate future
given the number of new programs for improving court services that the
current court administration is pushing and the upward trend in case fil-
ings in the New York courts.
Another difficult problem faced by the New York court system is re-
sponding to the move for broadening the role of the courts in dealing
with some kinds of social problems. How extensively, how rapidly and
in what kinds of cases should the New York courts provide protracted
oversight to troubled individuals and families before them in efforts to
resolve or substantially alleviate the problems faced by these parties?
Also, to what extent should these judicial efforts be team-based with
other aid groups and what should be the role of judges in these team ef-
forts? Community courts and drug treatment courts are examples of
courts operating under this broadened role of what courts should be do-
ing but there presently are relatively few such courts in New York. Over
time, the New York court system must determine where and when to ex-
pand the number of community and drug treatment courts and, as well,
on what other courts to impose this less traditional judicial role. Team-
based monitoring of parties before the courts is not new. It has, for ex-
ample, long been common in child custody and probation of convicted
criminals. What is new is extending it to types of cases in which it has
not been common and the increased emphasis on correcting antisocial
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behavioral patterns by means other than incarceration. The team-based
monitoring approach may require hard-to-get additional funding and it
may be unpopular with many influential segments of the population that
believe penal sanctions are the best corrective for criminal behavior. In
addition, there are questions as to whether judges are adequately trained
or psychologically suited to being team-based participants. However, the
prevalence of such illegal behavior as drug-related crime, juvenile delin-
quency and domestic violence make it essential that new attempts be
made to prevent this behavior. The New York courts will remain under
pressure to do their part by further efforts to increase the number and
effectiveness of community and drug treatment courts and to extend the
approach ofthese courts to additional courts.
A long-time New York court system problem that will not soon go
away is the selection and retention of judges. There is widespread dis-
satisfaction with the present patchwork system, a result of past political
compromises. Demands for change will continue and minor alternations
may be made. Patronage benefits to those with power over the selection
and retention process is a major reason for the present system, and pa-
tronage advantages no doubt will remain a major bargaining considera-
tion in any reform efforts. However, apart from the patronage issue, it is
a challenge to come up with a sufficiently satisfactory judicial selection
system for any state, especially one as large and diverse as New York.
What system can be devised that will properly balance judicial account-
ability to the populace and a requisite degree of judicial independence;
that will also provide a competent judiciary in terms of legal knowledge,
social sensitivity, administrative ability, demeanor and willingness to
work; and further, that will be sufficiently diverse in ethnic, racial and
gender terms to be generally respected and trusted, especially by those
who come before the courts? Given these challenging questions, no
wonder the problem remains a persistent one.
Another persistent New York court system problem, but one with
more promising prospects for resolution, is court structure. Needed re-
form is not likely to occur in the next few years, as it \vill take time for
the forces favorable to reform to regroup and renew their efforts follow-
ing failure to achieve passage of the Kaye proposal in 1998. But the ex-
isting structure is so archaic and arguments for retaining it so weak that
major reform, quite possibly something very similar to the Kaye pro-
posal, seems probable within the next decade.
Another persistent New York court system problem that has encour-
aging future resolution prospects is court facilities. New courthouse con-
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struction plans now being implemented assure that within the next dec-
ade many New York communities will have new, larger and better de-
signed court buildings. Even in New York City, where courts have often
had to operate in overcrowded, poorly designed and poorly maintained
buildings, change is underway, with some new courthouses recently
completed and others soon to be built. The state is also moving very
positively toward automating its court information systems, an essential
to any modem administrative operation. More new, up-to-date computer
information equipment is being installed in courthouses and tied into
system-wide information networks.
Needed court reform would be greatly facilitated if the law schools
in New York assumed a major continuing obligation to develop and im-
part knowledge of how the courts in the state are organized and admin-
istered and what organizational and administrative changes are needed.
Much more teaching time and attention should be given to these subjects.
Legal academics tend to ignore them, which has contributed to many
New York lawyers lacking adequate understanding of the court system in
their own state and has weakened the bar's pressures for reform. Re-
search and writing by legal academics on state court structure and opera-
tion issues, New York as well as elsewhere, also is surprisingly sparse.
This teaching and research neglect by the law schools of such important
aspects ofthe judicial system should be corrected.
The leadership of the New York State court system can be relied on
to push vigorously for appropriate reforms that will solve or substantially
alleviate the more difficult and persistent problems facing the court sys-
tem. Needed reforms in most instances, however, also require action by
the legislature and the governor, and needed action from those sources
seldom is assured. It would be helpful if the organized bar and public
interest groups concerned about the courts would cooperate more fully
and more aggressively with court leadership in seeking needed court re-
forms.
Given its many problems, the New York State court system functions
admirably. However, its major problems result in serious shortcomings
in the system's effectiveness that have very adverse consequences for
how justice is administered in New York. The court system's major
problems are financially and politically difficult ones but are solvable.
Much greater effort to solve them should be taken by those with the
power and authority to achieve needed changes, particularly the Gover-
nor and the legislative leadership ofboth major political parties.
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